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           Introduction  
  
  
In the past few years there has been an exponential increase in large land-based 
investments, which are often referred to as ‘land grabs’1. Despite having the potential to 
bring great benefits, such as employment generation, infrastructure creation and 
substantial injections of capital, these projects have proved to be risky and to have severe 
negative impacts on poor rural communities. Since human rights are an issue I profoundly 
care about, I have thus decided to try to understand the dynamics underlying these land-
based investments and what issues need to be tackled to improve the situation of the 
people that are negatively affected. 
The introductory chapter aims to outline the context in which the modern scramble 
for land is framed, as it is a complex global phenomenon with deep historical roots. After 
a brief terminology clarification, the events that have preceded, allowed and triggered the 
current wave of transnational land acquisitions are analysed. The main investors and 
targets of the investments are then identified, together with their degree of involvement 
and the drivers pushing them. To follow, socio-economic and environmental impacts of 
the investors’ projects are evaluated. A short section will also be dedicated to water and 
ocean grabbing, two phenomena affecting water and marine resources which show some 
similarities with land grabbing. 
In the writing of the first chapter, reference will be made to the work by Lorenzo 
Cotula, a researcher and team leader at the International Institute for Environmental 
Development specialized in land and other natural resource investments in the lower-
income countries, especially in Africa. Another scholar who authored some interesting 
reports is Ward Anseeuw, a development economist, policy analyst and researcher at the 
Agricultural Research Centre for International Development. Information collected on 
Land Matrix, an online public database of large-scale land deals, will also be consulted.  
After the outline of the global context of the current scramble for land, in the 
second chapter the geographic focus is narrowed to a specific country, namely Tanzania.  
I decided to select Tanzania as a country of study for two main reasons. The first is 
personal, as in 2014 I had the opportunity to spend a few months in this country and see 
 
1 For the definition of ‘land grabbing’ see the p. 7. 
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first-hand the living conditions of the rural population. The second reason is academic, as 
my curricular languages are English, German and Portuguese. As it will be seen later, 
Tanzania was under the control of the Portuguese first, of the Germans and finally of the 
British. 
The second chapter opens up with a presentation of the socio-economic profile of 
today’s Tanzania and some basic information about the morphology and climate of the 
region. The history of the country is then summarized, in order to understand how past 
events have shaped the society and still influence its domestic economy. There follows a 
historical review of the land tenure regime in this country and the land legislation in force 
today, including the main initiatives proposed by the Tanzanian government to attract 
foreign capital in the agricultural sector. Finally, the legal framework governing 
investments is presented and a broad overview of transnational land deals in Tanzania is 
offered.  
This section of the thesis is mainly based on the analysis of land laws and policies 
regulating foreign investments in Tanzania. Also valuable was the contribution of the 
researcher at the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies Emmanuel Sulle, who 
has published various studies on investments in agriculture in collaboration with other 
researchers. Noteworthy is then the report by the Oakland Institute, an independent policy 
think tank that has unveiled land investment deals in several developing countries, 
including Tanzania. 
To conclude, the third and final chapter investigates the transnational land-based 
projects in Tanzania run by three different companies, namely Sun Biofuels, EcoEnergy 
and Bioshape. In particular, the impacts of these investments on local contexts are 
evaluated, presenting both positive and negative outcomes. 
The choice fell on these three projects as they are those on which the material 
available was enough to analyse them under various aspects and compare them. It would 
have been extremely interesting to investigate also more successful investments, but this 
was not possible due to lack of material.  
Fundamental source of information for the drafting of the third chapter were the 
publications of associations and individual researchers who worked in the field to 
reconstruct the process of land allocation and document the impacts of the investment. 
This was done mainly through interviews and focus groups with several stakeholders 
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involved in the project.  More specifically, the case study of the Sun Biofuels’ project is 
mainly based on Fabio de Blasis’ work, a PhD graduate from the University of Bologna, 
and the report that the Oakland Institute dedicated to this investment. The main reference 
for the investment by EcoEnergy was instead a report published by the NGO ActionAid, 
whose primary aim is to fight poverty and injustice worldwide. Some information was 
also taken from a document drawn up by EcoEnergy itself, but obviously in this source 
only the benefits that the investment brings are underlined and no mention of the potential 
negative consequences is made. As far as the case of Bioshape is concerned, once again 
the work of Sulle and his fellow researchers proved to be an interesting and valuable 
source of information. 
This thesis aims to evaluate the impacts of foreign large-scale investments on the 
affected rural communities and more generally on local contexts.  The intent is to 
understand if this type of investments can represent an effective tool to reduce rural 
poverty and boost the economy, as advocated by the Government of Tanzania, or if it is 
an unsuccessful strategy instead. An attempt is also made to identify the most critical 
points of foreign investments with the view to understanding what issues need to be 
addressed, so that the benefits brought by the investments are maximized and turned into 
long lasting ones. Since the vast majority of the references on which this thesis is based 
date back to some years ago, I will also try to fill the information gap regarding land deals 
in recent years by presenting an up-to-date analysis of the data contained in the Land 
Matrix database. Indeed, after the explosion of studies and research carried out in the 
years following the Daewoo case, which arose an initial great interest in land grabbing, 














































First chapter. Scramble for land: a global phenomenon 
 
 
1.1 A definition of ‘land grabbing’ 
When the term ‘land grabbing’ is used in this thesis, it follows the definition 
reported in the Tirana Declaration of 2011, in which it was described as acquisitions or 
concessions “that are one or more of the following: 
(i) in violation of human rights, particularly the equal rights of women;  
(ii) not based on Free, Prior and Informed Consent1 of the affected land-users; 
(iii) not based on a thorough assessment, or are in disregard of social, economic 
and environmental impacts, including the way they are gendered;  
(iv) not based on transparent contracts that specify clear and binding commitments 
about activities, employment and benefits sharing, and;  
(v) not based on effective democratic planning, independent oversight and 
meaningful participation”2. 
It is crucial to note, however, that not all land deals have been contested as land grabs. 
For this reason, the term ‘land grab’ will only be used after verifying that one or more of 
the conditions listed above are met. Otherwise, the more neutral expressions ‘land deal’, 
‘acquisition’ or ‘allocation’ will be used.  
 
1.2 Historical roots of the scramble for land in Africa 
Land grabbing is not a new phenomenon, but it dates back to colonial times, when 
European colonizers asserted political sovereignty over the territories and acquired 
 
1 The principle of Free, Prior Informed Consent (FPIC), initially developed with regards to defending the 
rights of indigenous people, allows a community to give or withhold consent to a project that may affect it 
or its territories. Furthermore, FPIC enables community members, once given their consent, to withdraw it 
at any stage and to negotiate the conditions under which the project will be designed, implemented, 
monitored and evaluated. Specifically, the consent must be: 
•  Free: refers to a consent given voluntarily and without coercion, intimidation or manipulation. 
• Prior: means that consent is sought sufficiently in advance of any authorization or commencement of 
activities  
• Informed: information provided about the project and its potential impacts must be complete, objective 
and accessible to the community members.  
Sources: www.fao.org/indigenous-peoples/our-pillars/fpic/en/ [last accessed 10.06.2020] and FAO, Free, 
prior and informed consent. An indigenous peoples’ right and a good practice for local communities, 2016, 
pp. 12-16. 
2 International Land Coalition, Tirana Declaration. Securing land access for the poor in times of intensified 
natural resources competition, Paper presented at the Global Assembly, Tirana, 24-26 May 2011, p. 2. 
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ownership of the vast areas of land they conquered. The main legal fiction applied was 
the concept of ‘terres sans maître’ or ‘vacant and unoccupied lands’, whereby all 
unregistered properties were deemed to be public land and were thus handed over to 
governments to administer3. In that period, the population density in Africa was much 
lower than today and fewer resource uses were considered as productive activities; 
consequently, the greater part of Africa came to be owned by colonial nations4. The scale 
of this phenomenon increased in the 19th century, when the emergence of mass 
consumption societies in the Global North urged the need for sourcing increasing 
quantities of raw material for industrial production. This, combined with political rivalries 
among countries and rising nationalisms, fuelled imperialistic ambitions in European 
powers5. In Southern, Eastern, and Northern Africa, Western companies expropriated the 
local population6 and set up plantations to produce cotton, palm oil, rubber and other 
export commodities required by industrializing economies7. On the contrary, in much of 
western Africa, where markets and trading routes were well-developed, Europeans 
preferred to source agricultural produces from local farmers8. In these cases, no physical 
dispossession took place but access to land became conditional upon farmers paying taxes 
to their chiefs9. A third and final control pattern under colonial rule developed in areas in 
which pre-existing trade was not well developed, as in Central Africa and the Congo 
Basin. These lands were allocated through large concessions to chartered companies, 
which gained exclusive rights to exploit local resources and were in charge to develop 
transport infrastructures and administrative systems. Unlike peasant proprietary 
production, resources under concession belonged to the company and the locals were 
merely performing labour services10. In each of these three cases the colonial regime 
strongly weakened local land rights and its legacy still influences land laws in African 
countries to this day.  
 
3 L. Alden Wily, The tragedy of public lands: the fate of the commons under global commercial pressure, 
Rome, ILC, 2011, pp. 54-55. 
4 L. Cotula, The great African land grab? Agricultural investments and the global food system, London, 
Zed Books Ltd, 2013, p. 17. 
5 Ivi, pp. 16-17. 
6 I. Wallerstein, Three Stages of African Involvement in the World Economy, 1974, quoted by K.S. Amanor, 
“Land Governance in Africa. How historical context has shaped key contemporary issues relating to policy 
on land”, Rome, ILC, 2012, p. 17. 
7 Cotula, The great African land grab?, p. 18. 
8 Amanor, Land Governance in Africa, p. 17. 
9 Cotula, The great African land grab?, p. 19. 
10 Amanor, Land Governance in Africa, p. 18. 
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A second wave of land grab occurred after the declarations of independence made 
by colonies from the late 1950s, when a new generation of political leaders came to power 
and started a process of decolonization11. However, many post-independence countries 
inherited colonial-age legal systems, rather than rewriting them to guarantee stronger land 
rights for local people. Law continued to be geared towards centralizing resource control 
in the hands of the state and, in the following decades, many governments strengthened 
their control over the territory through land nationalization and expropriations12, further 
eroding land rights for the rural population. This wave of land grabs was thus perpetrated 
no more by colonial regimes, but by independent local governments.  
Between the 1980s and the 1990s, radical political and economic changes occurred 
in the African continent, which led to a greater reliance on the private sector in the 
promotion of economic development. As a consequence, many states sought and 
managed to attract foreign investments by revising land laws, offering fiscal incentives 
and introducing new legal protections for investors13. These initiatives proved to be 
efficient and, especially starting from the mid-2000s, Africa has been witnessing a new 
wave of land acquisitions triggered mainly by socio-economic dynamics14. 
Despite being such an old phenomenon, the land rush started attracting global 
attention only since 2008. In that year the South Korean company Daewoo Logistics 
obtained a 99-year land lease agreement on 1.3 million hectares in Madagascar, an area 
equal to almost half of the arable land of the country, to farm maize and biofuels crops 
mainly for the Korean market. Through this deal, Daewoo Logistics expected to pay 
nothing to have access to that territory since it was considered by Korean officials to be 
totally undeveloped land. In return, Madagascar should have benefited from jobs creation 
and investments in infrastructures such as roads, irrigation and grain storage facilities15. 
The contract was eventually cancelled after the harsh protests of the local communities 
and the military involvement, which in 2009 led to the ouster of the then Malagasy 
President Ravalomanana16. This episode, however, was significant because of the 
 
11 Cotula, The great African land grab?, p. 22. 
12 F.K.F. Byamugisha, Securing Africa’s land for shared prosperity. A program to scale up reforms and 
investments, Washington DC, Agence Française de Développement and World Bank, 2013, p. 45. 
13 Cotula, The great African land grab?, p. 24. 
14 W. Anseeuw, L.A. Wily, L. Cotula and M. Taylor, Land rights and the rush for land. Findings of the 
global commercial pressures on land research project, Rome, ILC, 2012, p. 57. 
15 www.ft.com/content/6e894c6a-b65c-11dd-89dd-0000779fd18c [last accessed 30.03.2020]. 
16 news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7952628.stm [last accessed 30.03.2020]. 
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staggering media coverage it received. In recent years, not only have acquisitions of large 
plots of land increased but also more and more non-governmental organizations, 
associations and researchers have become interested in the phenomenon of land grabbing 
and its severe impacts on rural communities and ecosystems. 
In conclusion, the current scramble for land represents the acceleration of an 
ongoing process that has its roots in the colonial period, to the extent that land grabbing 
is also dubbed as the ‘new-colonialism’17.  
 
1.3 Drivers of the land rush 
The several drivers that have triggered this recent wave of land rushing tend to 
overlap and are often interlinked, making the picture intricate and complex. Three main 
factors seem to underpin this dramatic rise in land investments, namely food security 
concerns, the rising demand for biofuels and the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
1.3.1. Food security 
After 40 years of constant price decline18, suddenly the scene changed: between 
January 2005 and June 2008 average world prices for wheat increased by 127%, rice by 
170% and maize prices almost tripled19. To trigger this dramatic swing was what the 
experts of the World Food Program called a ‘perfect storm’, a complex interplay of 
several factors that acted simultaneously in this period20. 
One of the factors that underpinned this crisis was the decline in global grain 
stocks. Whereas until the 1990s substantial public supplies were maintained, starting from 
the new millennium governments stopped holding large buffer stock, since cereals prices 
were constantly low, crop yield seemed abundant21 and agricultural markets had become 
increasingly liberalized22. In recent years, however, the world-population growth rate has 
been increasing faster than the one of food supply, meaning that more grain is being 
 
17 F. Roiatti, Il nuovo colonialismo: caccia alle terre coltivabili, Milano, EGEA Università Bocconi, 2010. 
18 L. Cotula, “The international political economy of the global land rush: a critical appraisal of trends, 
scale, geography and drivers”, The Journal of Peasant Studies 39:3-4 (2012), p. 662. 
19 A. Mittal, “The 2008 Food Price Crisis: Rethinking Food Security Policies”, Research paper presented 
at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York and Geneva, 24-30 June 2009, p. 
1. 
20 Roiatti, Il nuovo colonialismo, p. 2. 
21 Ivi, p. 2. 
22 Mittal, “The 2008 Food Price Crisis”, p. 4. 
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consumed than being produced. To meet the increasing demand, it was necessary to cut 
into already scarce reserves, causing agricultural prices to rise23. Moreover, in 2005 
adverse weather conditions further aggravated the situation by damaging production in 
some areas of the world. Australia, for example, lost more than 2% of its harvest due to 
one of the worst droughts of the century24. 
Expansion of biofuel production also played an important role in food price 
upswing, mainly via the diversion of crops from food production to the production of 
bioethanol and biodiesel25. As a consequence, land for food output decreased. 
Another factor that contributed to the food crisis was the depreciation of the US 
dollar and the consequent increase in the cost of oil, simultaneously accompanied by the 
increase in fertilizer prices; between 2001 and 2008, for instance, the price of urea, which 
is one of the most widely used fertilizers, more than quadrupled26.  The increase in oil 
and fertilizers prices had an impact on the costs of the entire production chain of 
agricultural commodities and on the prices of the final products27. 
Finally, speculation in financial markets also played a role. Investors like large 
banks, hedge funds, pension funds, and companies such as Cargill have indeed moved 
into futures markets since the deregulation of the United States commodities futures 
markets at the end of the 1990s. The stock exchange, which previously served as a 
regulatory instrument, then became a gigantic speculative market, where financial players 
could accumulate impressive profits thanks to confidential information they have 
available, their storage capacity and the oligopolistic management of trade28. 
These factors, acting simultaneously, caused a surge in food prices, which reached 
levels hardly imaginable only a few years before. In response price hikes, massive public 
protests erupted in many countries29 and alarmed governments, especially in countries 
that had to rely on imports to feed their populations. The importing countries with 
economic availability, such as Saudi Arabia, Japan, China, India, Korea, Libya and 
 
23 United Nations, The global social crisis. Report on the World Social Situation 2011, New York, 2011, p. 
70. 
24 Roiatti, Il nuovo colonialismo, p. 3. 
25 United Nations, The global social crisis, p. 68. 
26 FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the World. How does international price volatility affect domestic 
economies and food security?, Rome, 2011, p. 29. 
27 Roiatti, Il nuovo colonialismo, pp. 2-3. 
28 S. Liberti, I signori del cibo. Viaggio nell’industria alimentare che sta distruggendo il nostro pianeta, 
Rome, Minimum Fax, 2016, p. 173. 
29 United Nations, The global social crisis, p. 62. 
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Egypt30, hastened to gain control of vast areas of farmland in other countries to cultivate 
them, so that they could guarantee food at a good price to their population and thus avoid 
possible internal problems. 
The graph in Figure 1.1 plots the evolution of the food price index of the 
International Monetary Fund and the number of international land acquisitions recorded 
by the press. It can be observed that the scramble for land started in 2007-2008, in 
conjunction with the food prices explosion. After the crisis, commodity prices soon 
returned to more moderate levels, whereas investors’ interest in farmland persisted. 
 
Fig. 1.1 - The evolution of the Commodity food price Index and number of media reports on foreign land 
acquisitions (IMF Commodity food price index and www.farmlandgrab.org for press reports). 
(Source: R. Arezki, K. Deininger and H. Selod, What drives the global land rush?, International Monetary 




However, countries’ food security was endangered not only by rising food prices, 
but also by changes in diets occurring in these last decades. In this regards changes in the 
food consumption pattern of the Chinese population had a particularly deep impact. China 
has recently experienced an impressive economic development and a consequent increase 
in the purchasing power of the Chinese population, which has been progressively 
 
30 GRAIN, Seized! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security, 2008, p. 2. 
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abandoning its traditional plant-based diet and shifted to a higher consumption of meat. 
If in the early 1990s a Chinese citizen consumed an average of 25 kilos of meat per year, 
today the pro capita amount reached about 54 kilos31. In particular, China ranks first place 
in the world for the production and consumption of pork meat32 and it became necessary 
to open intensive farms where pigs are fed with soy and corn-based feeds, which make 
the animals fatten more quickly thanks to their high protein content33. The problem is that 
China is unable to produce the immense amount of food needed to feed its animals and it 
is thus forced to import it. The People’s Republic in fact hosts 22% of the world 
population but owns only 7% of the arable lands34, which is why at some point it needed 
to review its food policies and choose which crops to reserve its land for and which 
cultivations to outsource. Beijing decided to keep internal the production of cereals such 
as maize and wheat, which are considered strategic, while it has been forced to import 
soybean. According to FAOSTAT data, today the Asian power imports 73 million tons 
of soybean, that is 67% of the entire world trade, and the trend is constantly growing35. 
Finally, the issue of food security is also aggravated by the world population 
growth. The world is expected to host about nine billion people by 2050, which according 
to FAO means that food production will have to increase by 70% in order to meet the 
food needs of such a large number of people36.  
 
1.3.2. Biofuels 
In recent years biofuels37 have started to be seriously considered as an alternative 
to fossil fuels worldwide, even if this industry started back already in the early 1970s38. 
In particular, ethanol, produced mainly from sugarcane, and biodiesel, obtained from 
 
31 Roiatti, Il nuovo colonialismo, p. 1. 
32 R. Liu, L. Xing, G. Zhou, and W. Zhang, “What is meat in China?”, Animal Frontiers 7:4 (2017), p. 53. 
33 Liberti, I signori del cibo, p. 122. 
34 Ivi, p. 165. 
35 Ivi, p. 167. 
36 J. Bruinsma, “The resource outlook to 2050: by how much do land, water and crop yields need to increase 
by 2050?”, Paper presented at the FAO Expert Meeting on How to Feed the World in 2050, 24-26 June 
2009, p. 2. 
37 Biofuels can be defined as liquid, solid or gaseous energy carriers derived from the conversion of 
biomass.  
Source: D.Y. Goswami and Y. Zhao, “Proceedings of ISES World Congress 2007”, Solar Energy and 
Human Settlement 1:5 (2008), Berlin, Tsinghua University Press and Springer-Verlang, p. 2942. 
38 F. Songela and A. Maclean, Scoping Exercise (Situation Analysis) on the Biofuel Industry within and 
outside Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Energy for Sustainable Development, 2008, p. 1. 
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oilseeds such as jatropha, have been increasingly promoted as the best substitutes for 
fossil fuels to run vehicles39. 
The major driver for the increased demand and production of biofuels was the fuel 
crisis. In an attempt to relieve the situation after the subprime mortgage sector crisis, the 
US monetary authorities increased the supply of money, leading to a decrease in the 
interest rates and thus to a sharp depreciation of the US dollar40. This policy had an impact 
on the oil prices, which trebled within a few months until exceeding 147 dollars a barrel41, 
and prompted various countries, concerned about their energy security and their energy 
import bills, to devise alternative strategies such as the development of the biofuels 
industry. 
Another key factor driving interest in renewable energy sources has been the 
potential for economic and rural development. In countries with favourable endowments 
of land, labour and trade conditions, the production and export of biofuels started to be 
seen as an opportunity to improve their trade balance through the development of new 
export markets and to provide better opportunities for local farmers42. 
Finally, also climate change mitigation is often presented as a key policy goal, at 
least formally. The use of petroleum products for transport and power generation is the 
major contributor of greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere43 and, according to 
some, replacing fossil fuels with agrofuels would limit environmental damages. However, 
scientific studies have proved that different biofuels vary widely in their greenhouse gas 
balances when compared with petrol and some of them, such as nitrous oxide, can be 
even more harmful to the environment than fossil fuels44. 
 
39 Ivi, p. 30. 
40 G. Rapsomanikis, The 2007 –2008 food price swing. Impact and policies in Eastern and Southern Africa. 
Rome, FAO, 2009, p. 16. 
41 United Nations, The global social crisis, p. 68. 
42 A. Dufey, S. Vermeulen and W. Vorley, Biofuels: Strategic Choices for Commodity Dependent 
Developing Countries, Amsterdam, Common Fund for Commodities, 2007, pp. 41-51, quoted by L. Cotula, 
S. Vermeulen, R. Leonard and J. Keeley, Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investment 
and international land deals in Africa, London and Rome, FAO, IIED and IFAD, 2009, p. 54. 
43 Songela and Maclean, Scoping Exercise (Situation Analysis) on the Biofuel Industry within and outside 
Tanzania, p. 3. 
44 FAO, The state of food and agriculture, Rome, 2008, p. 55. 
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The European Union, the United States and other countries started adopting 
policies favouring the use of biofuels to enhance energy security, benefit from economic 
returns, promote rural development and reduce carbon emissions45.  
In 2003 under the Transport Biofuels Directive, the European Union established 
the goal of reaching a 5.75% share of renewable fuels in the transport sector by 201046 in 
order to reduce GHG emissions and diversify the energy market. In 2009 this share was 
subsequently raised by the Renewable Energy Directive to a minimum of 10% in every 
member state by 202047. With the expectation that biofuels would have been central to 
meeting the targets set in these policies, European companies have responded with 
widespread investments in the production of biofuel feedstocks both inside and outside 
of Europe48. It is indeed estimated that 20–30 million hectares will be required for the 
European Union to reach its aim, with 60% of supplies imported49. 
Another country that has adopted policies that have led to a growing demand for 
biofuels is the United States. In July 2005 the Energy Policy Act was approved by the 
Congress, which imposed that the amount of biofuel mixed with petrol had to reach 7.5 
billion gallons by 2012 and provided tax incentives for ethanol and biodiesel producers 
and retailers. In 2007 the Energy Independence and Security Act set an even more 
ambitious target: 15 billion gallons of ethanol by 201550. 
Global demand for biofuels is thus on the rise and datasets indicate that biofuels 
investments have become one of the dominant driving forces in transnational land 
acquisitions. According to the International Land Coalition 44% of land deals in 2009 
were for biofuel production. Nevertheless, a substantial regional variation can be 
observed; in particular, it is estimated that as many as 60-65% of the land acquired in 
Africa from foreign investors is destined for the cultivation of biofuels51. 
 
45 L. German, G.C. Schonevel and P. Pacheco, “Local social and environmental impacts of biofuels: global 
comparative assessment and implications for governance”, Ecology and Society 16:4 (2011), p. 1. 
46 European Union, “Directive 2003/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 May 2003 
on the Promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport”, Official Journal of the 
European Union, art.3.1.b (ii). 
47 European Union, “Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives”, Official Journal of the European Union, art.3.4. 
48 Cotula, “The international political economy of the global land rush”, p. 669. 
49 Anseeuw et al., “Land rights and the rush for land”, p. 26. 
50 Roiatti, Il nuovo colonialismo, pp. 3-4. 
51 Cotula, The great African land grab?, p. 67. 
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This is a trend destined to intensify in the future as a result of some recent new 
policies. In December 2018, for example, a new renewable energy directive entered into 
force, raising the overall EU target for renewable energy sources consumption to 32% by 
203052. Although studies on the effects of this recent directive have not been conducted 
yet, it is plausible that it will accelerate even more the race to land.  
 
1.3.3. Financial crisis 
In the past, land was not a typical investment sector. On the contrary, it was 
considered risky because of weather variability that could have a devastating impact on 
production and threat of government seizure of foreign-owned property. The situation 
began to change thanks to some progress in titling practices and legal security of land 
rights, policies in favour of foreign investments and structural adjustment reforms 
introduced in the 1980s, which made the purchase of land in developing countries 
increasingly attractive in the eyes of foreign investors53.  
The meltdown of the international financial markets caused by the bursting of the 
subprime mortgage bubble in the United States and the following recession led investors 
to consider the traditional stock market volatile and risky and, as a consequence, many 
diverted their capital to alternative and safer assets. Farmland appeared a valid alternative 
investment also because it is an asset increasingly claimed for the growing demand for 
agricultural commodities and its value is expected to rise as a result of its scarcity. World 
population growth, the increasing demand for biofuels and other non-food agricultural 
commodities, potential returns from carbon sequestration and other environmental 
services are indeed exacerbating competition for land. 
On the one hand, some agribusiness players traditionally involved in food 
processing and distribution started pursuing vertical integration strategies to enter direct 
production54. On the other hand, also some new players, such as banks, financial services 
firms and large-scale institutional investors, which on the contrary had no or barely any 
 
52 European Union, “Directive 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources”, Official Journal of the European 
Union, art. 3.1. 
53 J. Clapp, “The Financialization of Food: Who is Being Fed?”, Paper presented at the International Society 
for Ecological Economics Conference, Rio de Janeiro, 16-19 June 2012, p. 17. 
54 Cotula et al., Land grab or development opportunity?, p. 57. 
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experience in this field, have become significantly involved in acquiring rights to 
farmland55. 
 
1.3.4. Secondary drivers 
Besides these main causes, it is possible to identify also some secondary drivers, 
having a minor impact but nonetheless contributing to exacerbating the pressure on land 
resources.  
One of these is the development of carbon markets, which aim to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively by setting limits on emissions to states, 
industries or sectors. In the event that a subject is unable to produce a quantity of gas 
equal to or less than the quota assigned, it must purchase the credits it lacks from other 
subjects who have behaved in a more virtuous manner and can thus sell their own 
surpluses, gaining economically and in reputation. Several carbon markets have emerged, 
encouraging international companies to acquire several hectares of forest areas or 
deforested lands for reforestation to obtain carbon credits56. 
In addition, the recent surge in industrialization and consumption patterns have 
fueled the demand for raw material such as timber57, rubber and cotton58. When domestic 
production meets its natural limits, purchasing these commodities on the world market or 
outsourcing the production become necessary59. 
The expansion of the tourism sector is also fostering the scramble for land. 
International hotel chains such as Marriott, Four Seasons or Hilton are actively looking 
for high-value locations where to build large-scale tourist complexes, particularly in 
coastal areas60. Besides that, there is also a growing trend to buy large areas for 
ecotourism purposes61. 
Finally, many governments are freeing land for the creation of Special Economic 
Zones62 and their infrastructure, especially in Asia. Although these are not large areas, 
 
55 Clapp, “The Financialization of Food”, p. 2. 
56 Anseeuw et al., Land rights and the rush for land, p. 27. 
57 Ivi, p. 26. 
58 Cotula et al., Land grab or development opportunity?, p. 56. 
59 Ibidem. 
60 A. Zoomer, “Globalization and the foreignisation of space: seven processes driving the current global 
land grab”, The Journal of Peasant Studies 37:2 (2010), p. 438. 
61 Ivi, p. 436. 
62 Special Economic Zones are geographically delimited areas within which governments facilitate 
industrial activity through fiscal and regulatory incentives and infrastructure support.  
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they might be locations where land competition is already intense and this may have 
severe impacts on displaced local people63. 
 
1.4 Water grabbing 
A phenomenon deeply intertwined with the land rush is the so-called water 
grabbing, which refers to situations where powerful actors manage to take control of or 
reallocate to their own benefit water resources at the expense of previous local users or 
ecosystems on which those users’ livelihoods are based64.  
The extensive cultures that are established in large-scale production projects 
require irrigation systems that use an impressive amount of water to quench the crops. 
More specifically, it is estimated that between 450 and 700 litres of water are needed to 
produce one kilo of rice or soybean, while between 500 and 800 are needed to obtain one 
kilo of corn65. Yet the thirstiest crops are biofuels: to produce a litre of green fuels it takes 
approximately 2,500 litres of water, of which 820 come from irrigation66. Ensuring large 
volumes of water is thus crucial to guarantee secure and high yields.  
Outsourcing agricultural production is a way of relieving pressure over depleted 
domestic freshwater reserves by transferring it to other countries. This strategy was 
pursued mainly by countries with a high water-scarcity index, such as the Gulf States, but 
also by other countries that have low or moderate freshwater stress but aim to safeguard 
their water resources from potential depletion67. 
African countries have attracted many of these investments because they have only 
minimally exploited their irrigation potential due to scarce water infrastructure and thus 
implementation margins of irrigated agriculture are wide68. Nearly all industrial 
agriculture operations in this continent are located in major river basins and occupy fertile 
and fragile wetlands or are situated in more arid areas where water can be draw from 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2019. Special Economic Zones, New York, United Nations, 
2019, p. 128. 
63 Zoomer, “Globalization and the foreignisation of space”, p. 437. 
64 Transnational Institute, The global water grab: A primer, 2014, p. 3. 
65 www.fao.org/3/s2022e/s2022e02.htm [last accessed 20.03.2020]. 
66 Roiatti, Il nuovo colonialismo, p. 17. 
67 W. Anseeuw, M. Boche, T. Breu, M. Giger, J. Lay, P. Messerli and K. Nolte, Transnational Land Deals 
for Agriculture in the Global South. Analytical Report based on the Land Matrix Database, Bern, 
Montpellier and Hamburg, CDE, CIRAD and GIGA, pp. 32-33. 
68 C. Smaller, H. Mann, A Thirst for Distant Lands: Foreign investment in agricultural land and water, 
Winnipeg, IISD, 2009, p. 5. 
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rivers or underwater reserves69. As today about a third of Africans lives in already water-
scarce environments70, this pressure on water resources has not only jeopardized the 
fragile river system of the region but also threatened the livelihoods of small local 
farmers, pastoralists and fisherfolk relying on these water resources. In addition, massive 
irrigation systems had adverse impacts on the local flora and fauna and generated 
problems of soil degradation, salinization and waterlogging71. 
The Nile basin, for instance, accommodates several large-scale agricultural 
projects, provoking environmental damages and social distress and exacerbating political 
tension over water control dispute72. In Ethiopia, where roughly 80-90% of the Nile’s 
water originates, the government set no limit to water withdraw for irrigation and canals 
designed to supply water to large agribusinesses pose a threat to water availability for 
people living downstream73. For example, Egyptian agriculture depends solely on the 
Nile for irrigation and a reduction in the river flow gives cause for concerns74. Moreover, 
Ethiopia is building a colossal hydroelectric dam on its branch of the Nile that is likely to 
further reduce water flow to Egypt and fuel the political tension between these countries75. 
Increasing volume of water has been diverted for irrigation also from the Niger 
River. In Mali, large projects run by foreign investors can take up to 70% of the river’s 
flow in the dry season, leading to a shortage of water that has been having a deep impact 
on the two million Malians living on the delta of the Niger River and the local flora and 
fauna76. 
These cases are only two examples of a phenomenon affecting various rivers and 
other freshwater sources in the African continent and around the world. In the future, 
competition over control of water resources is likely to become more pronounced due to 
the expansion of irrigated land. Projected increases in cropping intensities and increments 
in productivity are expected to enlarge the area equipped for irrigation by about 6% and 
 
69 GRAIN, Squeezing Africa Dry: Behind every land grab is a water grab, p. 3. 
70 Ibidem. 
71 Ivi, p. 18. 
72 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa: land grabs leave Africa thirsty, 
2011, p. 3. 
73 Ibidem. 
74  www.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/opinion/02Brown.html?_r=1&ref=contributors [last accessed 
20.04.2020]. 
75 www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-50328647 [last accessed 20.04.2020]. 
76 www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2012/12/mali-wetlands-drained-foreign-agribusiness-water-grab 
[last accessed 20.04.2020]. 
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water withdrawals for irrigation by 10% by 205077. Besides that, climate change and 
rising temperatures will lead to greater evaporation and will make droughts and floods 
more frequent78.  
 
1.5 Ocean grabbing 
An analogous phenomenon to land grabbing is taking place in seas and oceans. 
More specifically, ocean grabbing is defined as dispossession or appropriation of use, 
control or access to ocean space or resources from prior resource users, rights holders or 
inhabitants79. This can occur in various ways, namely through shady access agreements 
that damage small-scale fishers, unreported catches, incursions into protected waters, and 
the diversion of resources away from local populations80. 
The key driving forces underpinning this phenomenon are of an economic nature. 
The first is the recent emergence of a complex corporate seafood regime, in which 
production chains are reconfigured through vertical and horizontal integration strategies. 
As a result, the control over fish access, processing, and retailing activities is increasingly 
concentrated into the hands of a few powerful players. These elites hold such great power 
that through effective lobbying they are able to influence the decision-making process 
over the model of production, that is, which fish ought to be fished, by whom and how. 
This results in the exploitation of fish resources and the adoption of practices that are 
detrimental to small-scale fishing communities and marine ecosystems. Particularly 
active on this front are China, Russia, the European Union, the United States and Japan81. 
Another driver of ocean grabbing is the profit-driven privatization of seascapes to a whole 
variety of activities, such as private real estate developments on coastlines, ecotourism 
zones around marine hotspots or hydropower dams strung out along major river 
systems82.  Finally, the third main driver of ocean grabbing is the financialization of 
 
77 FAO, The state of the world’s land and water resources for food and agriculture. Managing systems at 
risk, Abingdon and New York, Earthscan, 2011, p. 54. 
78 Roiatti, Il nuovo colonialismo, p. 18. 
79 N.J. Bennett, H. Govan and T. Satterfield, “Ocean grabbing”, Marine Policy 57:8 (2015), p. 62. 
80 Quotation by Oliver de Schutter in www.slowfood.com /slowfish/pagine/eng/news/news_detail--
idn=96.lasso.html [last accessed 21.11.2020]. 
81 www.expo2015.org/magazine/it/sostenibilita/ocean-grabbing.html [last accessed 21.11.2020]. 
82 Transnational Institute, The global ocean grab: A primer, 2014, pp. 15-17. 
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natural resources, which, as exposed before, is also closely connected with land and water 
grabbing83. 
In addition to large-scale companies, which can exert influence on policies 
framework and economic agreements, a variety of other actors and organizations with 
differing motivations might be accused of ocean grabbing. Some governments, for 
example, have approved reforms and policies that enclosure marine resources for various 
reasons. The justifications for these measures are mainly the need to cope with resource 
mismanagement stemming from lack of private property rights, definition, mapping and 
quantification of marine resources and fish stock, establishments of Exclusive Economic 
Zones84 and re-allocation of access and control over marine resources.  Moreover, 
international environmental organizations are lobbying for marine protected areas to be 
established as a conservation strategy to deal with overfishing, pollution, and habitat 
changes. However, most of these areas are valuable fishing grounds for small-scale local 
fishers, which can no longer practice their livelihood activities. Furthermore, 
environmental organizations are sometimes supported by large-scale wealthy 
philanthropic foundations, which increases their power85. 
The negative impacts of these practices fall first of all on the marine environment 
and fish stocks, which, except from the cases in which protected areas are established, are 
depleted due to excessive industrial fishing.  Furthermore, on marine resources depend 
the livelihood and food security of a significant proportion of the world’s population. 
Costal communities are dispossessed of their fishing grounds and water bodies, and the 
associated coastal lands bordering these. People are also often excluded from trading and 
processing the catches because of the concentration of supply-chain activities into 
relatively few selected large-scale facilities that are increasingly oriented toward export 
markets86. 
 
83 M. Fairbain, ““Like gold with yield”: evolving intersections between farmland and finance”, The Journal 
of Peasant Studies 41:5 (2014), pp. 780-781. 
84 The Exclusive Economic Zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific 
legal regime.  
Source: https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm [last accessed 
21.11.2020]. 
85 Transnational Institute, The global ocean grab, pp. 26-27. 
86 Ivi, p. 35. 
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Unlike land grabbing, ocean grabbing can result in just exploitation, without 
bringing positive effects that can derive from capital injections and economic resources 
from abroad.  
One of the countries most heavily affected by ocean grabbing is Senegal, where 
the system of fishing licenses is in the hands of organized crime and Chinese, Russian, 
Korean, Icelandic and Spanish fishing boats are literally emptying that part of the 
Atlantic. As a result, the catch of small Senegalese fishers dropped by 75% in 10 years87. 
 
1.6 Players involved 
One of the characteristics of the current wave of land grabs is its global dimension 
and the variety of players involved. In this paragraph it will be presented first the main 
investors, considering both their geographical origin and their type. Subsequently, the 
main recipient countries will be analysed. Particular attention will be paid to the African 
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1.6.1 Investors by geographical origin 





Determining the origin of investors might not be always straightforward and the 
nationality of the acquirer does not fully represent the geography of the interests at stake. 
Whereas determining a unique geographical origin of investors might be unequivocal in 
the case of governments and small firms, it presents some difficulties and is often 
impossible to identify for multinationals due to their ownership structures. Another issue 
arises when dealing with projects in which multiple investors are engaged, as it happens 
in about 7.7% of the deals88.  In addition, some countries act as strategic transit through 
which investments are channelled into target countries because they boast some peculiar 
characteristics, such as geographical proximity to the target region, favourable tax 
 
88 K. Nolte, W. Chamberlain and M. Giger, International Land Deals for Agriculture. Fresh insights from 
the Land Matrix: Analytical Report II, Bern, Montpellier and Hamburg, CDE, CIRAD, GIGA and 
University of Pretoria, 2016, p. 22. 
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regimes or a sizable number of bilateral investment treaties that can protect investors89. 
Finally, the implementation of large projects usually involves a range of players different 
form the investor, such as lenders, insurers, contractors and suppliers90, which might be 
located elsewhere91.  
Having said that, as a general rule three types of investor countries can be 
identified: emerging countries, the Gulf States and countries from the Global North. 
Within emerging countries, China is currently the leading acquirer worldwide with 
207 deals covering an aggregate surface of almost 9 billion hectares92. The Chinese 
Republic possesses relatively scarce arable land and, as a consequence, food and energy 
security play a role of primary importance in the government’s agenda. These has been 
achieved thanks to the considerable national financial resources, which have allowed 
Beijing to gradually outsource abroad part of the domestic production of food, biofuels 
and other raw materials. Land Matrix data show how China has become increasingly 
engaged in land acquisitions over the years: between 2000 and 2011 this country was only 
the ninth world investor for purchased hectares, then between 2012 and 2016 it reached 
the fifth position93 and today it is the global biggest investor94. China has been widely 
depicted as a leading acquirer of land in Africa, but its involvement in African agriculture 
is often overstated. As a matter of fact, Africa is not among China’s geographical 
priorities, and Chinese investors operating in this region are concentrating their efforts in 
sectors such as mining and infrastructure development, rather than in agriculture. In 
addition, the few Chinese agricultural investors in Africa are usually individual farmers 
engaged in relatively small-scale projects95. There is no evidence of a large land grab by 
Chinese investors in the African continent. 
Other Asian countries rich in economic resources but lacking sufficient arable land 
within their national borders, namely Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, heavily 
 
89 Cotula, “The international political economy of the global land rush”, p. 659. 
90 Ibidem. 
91 Land Matrix considers the location of investors headquarters to determine their country of origin, yet it 
must be remembered that affiliates can be registered in other countries. In investments in which multiple 
players are engaged, the full size of the deal is attributed to the country of origin of each of the investors 
involved. For this reason, the number of deals and the area under contract are larger than the total of unique 
deals.  
Source: Nolte et al., International Land Deals for Agriculture, p. 22. 
92 www.landmatrix.org [last accessed 30.04.2020]. 
93 Nolte et al., International Land Deals for Agriculture, p. 23. 
94 www.landmatrix.org [last accessed 30.04.2020]. 
95 Cotula, The great African land grab?, p. 60. 
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rely on imports to feed their large population and meet their energy needs. Both Japan 
and South Korea, for example, get around 60% of their food from abroad96 and policies 
on overseas farming is part of their food security agenda. This generally translates into 
support for national corporations, which have been acquiring lands overseas for 
farming97. The great majority of the investments originated from these countries are 
targeted to other Southeast Asian countries98, showing a strong intra-regional trend, but 
some large deals have been signed also in Africa99. 
India has seen foreign acquisition as a solution to domestic production issues since 
its agriculture presents several major problems, mainly regarding production costs, 
declining soil fertility and depletion of water resources. Spurred by the global food crisis 
and by the desire to compete in the global market, many agribusiness companies and the 
government-owned State Trading Corporation started sourcing food production overseas. 
Specifically, it was considered to be cheaper to offshore the production of oilseeds, pulses 
and cotton and keep cultivating wheat and rice at home100. India results to be an important 
but largely under-reported investor acquirer of land in Africa, where it sealed 53 deals 
covering a total area of almost a million hectares101.  
South Africa also represents a very active player, promoting projects for food and 
biofuels production targeting mostly other African countries, with a preference for 
Mozambique102.  
At first glance also the other BRICS countries, namely Russia and Brazil, appear 
to be leading land acquirers. Yet, looking more closely it results clear that they are 
primarily a target of land deals and play only a marginal role as investors. Almost all 
investments in which Russia is involved are deals within domestic borders; that is, foreign 
companies control affiliates in Russia, and through them they invest in Russian farmland 
and purchase hectares for timber plantation. The same applies to Brazil, with the only 
difference that land purchased by and in this country is mainly allocated to food and 
biofuel crop cultivation and livestock farming103.  
 
96 GRAIN, Seized!, pp. 4-5. 
97 Idem, The global farmland grab in 2016. How big, how bad?, 2016, p. 6. 
98 www.landmatrix.org [last accessed 30.04.2020]. 
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In general, investments from emerging economies are targeted towards other 
developing countries characterized by lower production costs, more abundant farmland 
and water resources and, in most of the cases, geographic proximity and climatic 
conditions for preferred staple crops. Food production remains the primary purpose of 
these land acquisitions, but biofuels and raw materials for the industry also plays an 
important role. 
The Gulf States account as another group of major players in transnational land 
acquisitions, mainly out of government concerns about ensuring national food security.  
These are countries located in desert areas with depleting water reserves but thanks to 
their enormous amounts of oil and capital they can afford to import their needed food 
supply from other countries. However, the food crisis hit the Gulf States exceptionally 
hard, not only because of the rise in food prices on the world market but also because of 
the depreciation of the US dollar, to which almost all of their national currencies are 
pegged. The combination of these two events resulted in a significant loss in the 
purchasing power of the population of these states and greater financial expenditure on 
food costs: their food import bill ballooned from 8 billion US dollars in 2003 to 20 billion 
US dollar in 2008104. Considering that the majority of the population of the Gulf states is 
constituted by low-wage migrant workers, it is essential to provide food at affordable 
prices to avoid social unrest and ensure political stability105. Therefore, these countries 
banded together and formulated a collective strategy of outsourcing food production. 
Gain direct control of foreign farmland and food production resulted to be the best option, 
since it allowed them to rely less on the international trade and to exclude middlemen as 
much as possible, cutting their food import bills by 20–25%106. The Gulf States tend to 
target primarily locations having some historical107, cultural and religious proximity108, 
such as Sudan, Morocco and Egypt109. 
Finally, also the Global North, namely the European Union and the United States, 
are heavily implicated in transnational land deals. This group of investors has received 
much less media coverage in comparison with the other ones, likely because many EU-
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based investors and companies have multiple foreign affiliates through which they 
operate and this makes it more complicated to trace investment roots. Despite that, 
companies registered in the European Union have signed numerous deals that, 
aggregated, cover vast amounts of land110. Among this group of investors, the United 
States stand out with an engagement in 227 agreements for a total surface of 6 billion 
hectares, followed by the UK, Switzerland and the Netherlands111. According to data 
operators from the Global North tend to negotiated land deals in Africa, in Eastern Europe 
and, to a lesser extent, in South America112; preferentially in countries with which they 
already have connections, such as former colonies113. Portugal, for example, has focused 
its transactions on Angola and Mozambique, whereas Spain has preferred concluding 
large deals in Mexico and Argentina114. Much of the investments made by Western 
countries are driven by biofuel policies and vertical integration strategies in the 
agribusiness sector115, but also financial speculation plays a prominent role in the land 
rush116. 
Generally speaking, investor countries have on average a GDP per capita 4 times 
higher than target countries and tend to be net food importers. On the contrary, target 
countries may be either net food importers or exporters. Recipient countries that are net 
exporters are the BRICS countries, which have a relatively well-developed food 
production system, while less developed countries still depend on food imports117. 
Land acquirers show a growing preference for investing in their own region, which 
might be linked to regional trade agreements, geopolitical considerations118, cultural 
affinity and the reduction of transport and transaction costs119. This trend results 
particularly strong in the case of South American investors, who remain within their own 
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region in 85% of the deals they are involved in, but it is clear also for Southeast Asian120 
and Eastern European players121. This intra-regional trend does not apply to Africa, where 
investors remain within their own region only in 45% of the deals122. 
 
1.6.2 Investors by type 
Heterogeneous is not only the geographical origin of the investors but also the type 
of investors. In this regard, various categories of players involved in the rush for land can 
be distinguished: private companies, stock exchange-listed companies, investment funds, 
public or state-owned companies and individual entrepreneurs.  
The distribution of investor types varies according to the geographic regions of 
origin. Investors from the North and South America and Europe are almost exclusively 
private companies, whereas public or state-owned operators are particularly active in the 
Gulf States, China and South Korea123.  
The leading investor type is represented by private companies, which are privately 
held by one or more owners of private equity and can vary greatly in size and scope, 
ranging from relatively small player engaged in a single small project to large companies 
that control areas of considerable size. They include banks, private equity funds, hedge 
funds and pension funds124. The second largest investor in large-scale land acquisitions 
are stock exchange-listed companies, which tend to engage in multiple land deals 
focusing on a single geographic region125. At first sight investment funds and state-owned 
entities may appear engaged in a smaller number of transnational land acquisitions. Yet, 
their involvement reaches further through indirect engagement since they are often part 
of highly complex investor chains and provide financial support to stock exchange-listed 
companies as their shareholders126. Moreover, government policies can stimulate and 
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support investments in foreign land acquisition127. Individual entrepreneurs are 
comparatively the least important type of investors128. 
As in the case of the geographic origin of the investors, it should be noted that also 
in the case of the investors type it is not always straightforward to identify to which 
category the players belong. First of all, land deals, project implementation and operation 
of activities often involve complex investment chains characterized by multi-layered 
shareholding and financial assistance. Composite investment chains are preferred as they 
may allow to benefit from preferential tax laws and protection through investment 
treaties129 and partnership with a domestic company can be required by law in some 
countries130. Behind large-scale agricultural projects can stand also banks providing 
financial support and companies buying the products being grown or processed, all actors 
necessary to the project success131. In most of the cases these structures show little 
transparency and, as a consequence, their components are difficult to trace. Furthermore, 
boundaries between public and private investors may be fuzzy, as the implementation of 
deals signed between governments can be driven by private operators and governments 
can provide diplomatic, financial and other support to private enterprises132. Lastly, in a 
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Also regarding recipient countries, it is possible to identify regions particularly 
affected by large-scale land acquisitions, that is, the former Soviet Eurasia, Africa, Latin 
America and Southeast Asia.  
Russia and Ukraine appear to be by far the top recipient countries, the former in 
terms of cumulative size and the latter in terms of number of projects134. The main reason 
for investors to acquire farmland in these countries is food crop production, particularly 
cereal, made possible thanks to fertile soil and a favourable land tenure structure135. Other 
former socialist countries in Eastern Europe have been attracting a  discrete number of 
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investments, but nevertheless the scale of the phenomenon in this area of the world is 
often underrepresented by many media reports. In Russia alone, almost 20 million 
hectares were purchased, approximately the same extent that was acquired throughout the 
entire African continent136 but the attention and resonance that Russia received was not 
even remotely comparable with the one reserved to Africa.   
By contrast, some media reports may have overemphasized the role of Africa as a 
target region in comparison with the other continents137, even if it is undeniable that it is 
an area attracting many investments. Specifically, land acquisitions are concentrated 
along major rivers and in Eastern Africa, although plots of land have been purchased by 
foreign investors to varying amounts and for various production purposes in almost all 
African states138. This high level of interest in acquiring land in Africa appears to be 
driven by its relative abundance of cheap and suitable for cultivation land139 and its 
increasingly liberalized trade and investment regime140.  
Moving to Latin America, Brazil and Argentina stand out both for the number of 
deals and for the surface area affected by these agreements141. Both countries already 
have developed agricultural-food value chains and domestic actors run large-scale farms, 
which facilitates the establishment of foreign investors with similar production models142. 
Land in Latin American countries is generally used to establish plantations of food crops 
and to raise livestock, although also cultivations of crops for biofuel production are 
widespread143.  
Finally, Southeast Asia also records large acquisitions, especially in Papua New 
Guinea, Indonesia, Myanmar and Cambodia144. 
Target countries tend to have weak land tenure systems that investors can exploit 
to their advantage so as to have easy and cheap access to land145. In most countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, very few rural people hold ownership rights, while 
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much land is owned or controlled by the state and the local population usually access it 
and its resources through customary rights146. The extent to which these customary rights 
enjoy legal recognition and protection under national law varies from country to country 
and depending on resource use147. Generally, however, legal protection of resources held 
under customary tenure is limited and it makes local people vulnerable to dispossession 
as governments sell or lease land148.  
Besides weak land tenure systems, many agreements have been stipulated in a 
context of corruption and poor transparency. Often decision-making and negotiations 
happen behind closed doors, undermining public scrutiny and creating a breeding ground 
for corruption149. It has been estimated that 15% of people entering into land 
administration services have paid bribes150. 
Although in some countries there have been some steps forward in legal 
recognition and protection of local farmers’ rights151, governments of many target 
countries seem to be more interested in adopting incentives to attract foreign investors 
rather than safeguarding rural people. In developing countries, foreign investments are 
usually welcomed as an opportunity to overcome decades of under-investment in the 
sector, create employment, and have access to technological innovations. Measures to 
attract investors include the introduction of tax breaks and other incentives for foreign 
investment, reforms in land laws to facilitate access to land152 and creation of promotion 
agencies or offices which offer support in the identification of land suitable for 
investments, facilitate concession processes, provide technical assistance and advisory 
services to investors153. In addition, large-scale acquisitions have been fostered by recent 
developments of international law and treaties which have strengthened the legal 
protection of actors involved in land purchases154. 
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1.7  Impacts of land allocations  
As many projects need years to achieve implementation and the consequences of 
the deals concluded years ago are only now starting to be felt, it is still too early to assess 
the full implications of the global land rush. However, case studies conducted to date have 
shown that large-scale land allocations can have several and deep impacts on target 
countries, affected rural communities and the environment. In this paragraph, effects 
caused by land allocations will be described in a broad outline, as impacts largely depend 
upon the institutional, socio-economic and ecological context in which the single project 
is inserted. 
 
1.7.1 Socio-economic impacts 
Investors and actors promoting investments describe the areas being targeted as 
‘empty’, ‘marginal’ or ‘idle’ to justify allocations to investors, yet this is a misleading 
portrayal of reality. Case studies indicate that these terms often reflect an assessment of 
the productivity, rather than the existence, of resource uses. This means that they are 
applied to areas that are perceived as unproductive but could actually present low-
productivity uses that may still play a crucial role in the livelihoods and food security of 
local people155.  For example, shifting cultivation and grazing are widespread in Africa 
but have usually gone unacknowledged by officials in charge of leasing out land156. In 
addition, despite the rhetoric of targeting marginal lands, acquirers are obviously more 
interested in the best lands in terms of yield potential, infrastructure development or 
proximity to markets157. 
As mentioned above, in developing countries most of the domestic land is owned 
by the state and rural people have access to it through weak customary rights. The 
governments of recipient countries are convinced that the flow of capital from abroad will 
bring them several benefits, and for this reason they prefer to grant domestic land 
extensions to foreign investors, ignoring traditional land-use rights of the local 
population158. 
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In almost half of the cases, communities affected by land acquisitions are not even 
consulted. Even when community members are involved during the decision-making 
process, the consultation process is usually described as ‘limited’. In these cases, for 
example, local populations are unable to understand what the project will entail or are put 
under pressure from authorities. According to reports, in only 14% of cases of Free, Prior 
and Informed Consent has been conducted159. As such, the vast majority of deals 
constitute land grabs.   
The most immediate impact associated with land allocations is the displacement 
of rural people to make the area available to investors. Information on the numbers of 
people affected is scarce: in the Land Matrix database just 89 projects report information 
on this issue, showing that in most cases a single deal can lead to the displacement of 
thousands of people160. On the whole, there are reasons to believe that publicly available 
information about the aggregate scale of the impact is underestimated. Indeed, it is very 
likely that some dispossessions may have not been documented. Moreover, national laws 
may not recognize that the land belongs to the villagers in the first place and, as a result, 
many people may lose their land without being formally expropriated161. In other cases, 
villagers may not be physically displaced, but their access to land and local resources can 
be dramatically squeezed. For instance, pastoralists may not lose their grazing grounds 
but agribusiness projects may block livestock corridors of crucial importance for herds to 
access water and dry-season grazing162.  
The legal obligation for investors or local governments to compensate individuals, 
families, and communities who have lost access to their land is required only by some 
national laws and land tenure systems. Most of the times no compensation is paid since 
the customary ownership of land occupants is not legally recognized. Even when 
promises of compensation materialized, in only about one-third of cases163, it is rarely 
adequate to restore local livelihoods164. 
 
159 Nolte et al., International Land Deals for Agriculture, p. 40. 
160 Ivi, p. 42. 
161 L. Cotula, Addressing the human rights impacts of ‘land grabbing’, Belgium, European Parliament, 
2014, p. 16. 
162 Ibidem. 
163 Nolte et al., International Land Deals for Agriculture, p. 42. 
164 Cotula et al., Land grab or development opportunity?, p. 92. 
 35 
Loss of access to land has been having adverse and severe impacts on local people, 
who are usually highly dependent on the land for their own food security. Most of the 
land area acquired is located in countries with an above-average prevalence of hunger165 
so for rural people the opportunity to cultivate their own plot of land, even of small size, 
is of paramount importance for their livelihood. Unfortunately, this consideration is often 
disregarded, as demonstrated by the fact that about 58% of the land allocated to outside 
investors was already being used for crop production166. Often agricultural products are 
also a source of income and allow families to complement their diets and to satisfy other 
basic needs167. Negative repercussions on food availability are perceived not only locally 
but also on a national level. As acquired land is mainly used for the production of non-
food commodities or food destined for export markets, the domestic market of the host 
country may be negatively affected and the population may need to purchase food from 
the world market to feed themselves168.  
In addition to being a livelihood asset, land may also have an important spiritual 
value, as in many societies it is deeply attached to social and cultural practices, beliefs 
and rituals. These cultural meanings and values are often completely overlooked in the 
processes of land allocation and no payment can fully compensate people for the loss 
suffered169. 
More indirect impacts may also be significant, though these are often more 
difficult to measure. One of the indirect effects is the increase in social inequalities since 
negative impacts are likely to hit hardest those who are already socially and economically 
the most disempowered categories. For example, case studies have shown the tendency 
for women to suffer disproportionately from land grabs. In reality, rural women play a 
crucial role in agricultural systems around the world: they produce 60-80% of the food in 
most developing countries and are the main producers of staple crops, such as rice, wheat 
and maize, that provide 90% of food consumed by the rural poor170. Moreover, secure 
access and control over land can give female farmers the opportunity to have an income 
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and socially empower themselves. Securing land tenure for rural women is thus 
fundamental to fight poverty and inequality, yet they have to face systematic 
discrimination in relation to the recognition of their land rights, in public discourse and 
in decision-making processes171. Consequently, it is easier for women farmers to be 
deprived of their land, which translates into a series of consequences such as the loss of 
their economic independence, the possibility of paying an education for their children, 
the increase in prostitution and their exposure to HIV172. Analysing the consequences of 
the land disposition against rural women clearly shows that the race to land can have a 
myriad of indirect effects, difficult to identify but heavily impacting.   
On the other hand, land acquisitions potentially offer significant opportunities to 
host countries and local communities, such as through the creation of employment and 
the consequent increase in employees’ incomes and welfare in a rural region. According 
to data available the majority of the projects have created more than 1,000 jobs, with 28% 
of the projects reporting even more than 5,000 positions created173. The number of jobs 
can therefore be substantial, even if they are generally fewer than expected174. Although 
on the one hand new jobs are created, on the other many smallholder farmers are crowded 
out, then sometimes it is difficult to differentiate between additional employment creation 
and job replacement.  Contract farming175 schemes are one option to include local 
smallholders. This production model, however, can only partially mitigate crowding out 
as it is applied on only about two out of every 10 hectares of land affected176. Overall, 
evidence points to a net employment loss, which is estimated to range between 28% and 
75% in the proximity of the investment site177.   
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Numerous concerns have been raised also about the working conditions, as these 
jobs are often low-paid and insecure178. Furthermore, many jobs are generated only during 
the start-up phase for farm construction and infrastructure development, yet once the 
project is on operation fewer labourers could be required. For instance, jatropha 
cultivation can create many jobs because handpicking is a viable harvesting system179, 
whereas for crops such as corn, wheat or soybeans, farming activities are largely 
performed with machinery180.  
Projects have further effects on the domestic economy. Large-scale farms are often 
located in proximity to smallholder farms and, as a consequence, it is likely that positive 
spillovers and technology and know-how transfers to local farmers materialize, especially 
in inclusive business models181. For example, communities can have access to productive 
infrastructure and learn new and more efficient agricultural techniques182. 
Land sales and rental fees can also increase public revenues. As governments in 
recipient countries prioritized foreign investments land cost is very low or not charged, 
and numerous exemptions and benefits further reduce tax revenues. Yet, these incentives 
may bring more investments and aggregate amounts of revenues can still be non-
negligible relative to the local economy. In some countries, arrangements also channel 
part of these payments back to affected communities and local authorities to promote 
development in the area183.  
Nevertheless, the most substantial benefit brought by large-scale projects is 
infrastructures. Besides the infrastructure development carried out during the 
establishment of the project, some companies deliberately invest in other infrastructures, 
usually as compensation or as a Corporate Social Responsibility initiative. They are 
mainly investments in human capital, through the construction of schools and health 
facilities, but also in roads, irrigation systems, storage facilities and other productive 
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infrastructures.  Some projects are reportedly associated also with capacity building and 
financial support through loans184. 
Even if both negative and positive outcomes have been highlighted, it should be 
noted that the distribution of the benefits does not necessarily favour the most adversely 
affected people and the negatives tend to outweigh the positives.   
 
1.7.2 Environmental impacts 
Large-scale, intensive, and industrialized agriculture employed by investors to 
have the maximum possible yield can entail severe environmental consequences. For 
example, one of the first actions undertaken in the early stages of implementation of a 
project is the clearance of forested and other non-farm habitats. According to data, 27% 
of international deals target land initially covered with forests185 and their conversion into 
farmland is associated with significant environmental damage since forests play an 
important role in water management, conservation of biodiversity and mitigating global 
warming as a carbon sink. Besides that, forests provide one billion of the poorest people 
with food, medicinal products and cash income through the sale of the collected products, 
thus contributing to their food security and livelihood186. The cleaning of peatlands has 
also serious environmental consequences as peat locks up huge amounts of carbon and 
draining and burning it releases massive amounts of greenhouse gases187, as well as 
endangering the entire local ecosystem. 
Overexploitation of land through the massive use of chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides contaminates soil, water, air and reduces or even destroys biodiversity. 
Pollution can also affect rural people that depend on natural resources and impair the 
enjoyment of the human right to health188. Additionally, large-scale agricultural projects 
almost always establish monocultures, which can further jeopardize the local biodiversity, 
decrease resilience to diseases and the ability to adapt to local conditions and to climate 
changes189. 
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Finally, as already mentioned, the irrigation systems cause the degradation of the 
soil, the reduction of the flow of the rivers or, in more extreme cases, the drying up of 
water resources190. These outcomes need obviously to be put into perspective against 
possible negative environmental impacts of previous land-use systems, such as slash-and-
burn systems of farming, but on the whole the effects of agricultural systems set up by 
investors are far more impacting on the environment.
 

























Second chapter. Contextualizing land deals in Tanzania. 
 
 
2.1 Today’s Tanzania 
The United Republic of Tanzania is a large country located in the eastern part of 
Africa. It borders the Indian Ocean to the east, Uganda and Kenya to the north, Burundi, 
Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the west, and Mozambique, Zambia 
and Malawi to the south. Its total land area is 945,087 sq.km, of which around 40% is 
classified as agricultural land1. However, only about 23% of all agricultural land is 
cultivated2. The human population was 58 million in 2019 with an annual growth rate of 
3% and a life expectancy at birth of about 65 years3. The capital city is Dodoma, where 
the national assembly, the presidential office, some ministries and government offices are 
located. Another important centre is Dar es Salaam, the principal commercial city and 
location of most government institutions.  
With the respect to its economic performance, Tanzania has been called ‘Africa’s 
sleeping giant’ because of its relatively high and stable economic growth4, yet it has 
remained a relatively poor country with a per capita income of just USD 1,080 in 2019, 
in the bottom 20% of the world’s economies5, and a ranking of only 159 out of 189 for 
its Human Development Index6. Tanzania has also been registering worrisome poverty 
levels, with almost half of the population living on less than USD 1.90 per day7. The 
economic growth is projected to remain positive but decelerate in 2020 due to the 
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The territory is mainly mountainous, with the average altitude of about 1,000 
meters. Plains stretch along the coastal area, especially around the delta of the rivers 
flowing into the Indian Ocean. Proceeding towards the hinterland the altitude gradually 
rises and turns into a vast plateau surrounded by various mountain ranges, of which the 
highest are the Mount Kilimanjaro to the northeast and the Great Rift Valley to the 
southwest. To the north and south of the central plateau there are some smaller plains, but 
still at high altitude.  The region is quite rich in water resources, with rivers springing 
from the plateau and then flowing eastwards to the ocean or westwards to the lakes. In 
Tanzania are located also the largest lake basins of the African Great Lakes region, of 
which the most important is Lake Victoria9. 
 
9 L. Berry, Tanzania in maps, London, London University Press, 1971, pp. 24-26 and 32. 
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The climate is influenced by the location close to the equator, the impact of the 
Indian Ocean and the overall morphology of the region. The coastal area and the islands 
experience a tropical climate, while most of the country is subtropical except for the areas 
at higher altitudes10. Average temperatures range between 17°C and 27°C, changing 
dramatically depending on the location. The warmest period occurs between November 
and February (25°C - 31°C), whereas the coldest one spreads between May and August 
(15°C - 20°C) 11. Mean annual rainfall also varies considerably according to season and 
geographical location. Two main rainfall patterns can be observed: northern and coastal 
areas experience a bimodal pattern with short rains from October to December and a 
longer period from March to May, while across the south and west it occurs a unimodal 
one with precipitations from December to April12. Tanzanian agriculture is mainly rain-
fed and annual crop production takes place during the rainfall patterns13. For this reason, 
failures of rainfall, drought and floods have resulted in food shortages and an upsurge in 
food prices, making many households unable to meet their consumption needs14. 
 
2.2 National history 
Tanzania lies in the cradle of humanity, that stretches from Ethiopia to South 
Africa, where ancestors of modern humans evolved at least 2 million years ago. The homo 
sapiens sapiens evolved in the same area about 200,000 years ago and began then to 
spread out of Africa about 70,000 years ago15. In the following millennia, the area was 
affected by several waves of migration and saw the settlement of various tribal 
communities16, among which the most important and numerous was the Bantu one17. 
While the hinterland was constantly crossed by migratory flows, the coastal areas 
experienced a dense network of trade exchanges, in particular with Arabs and Persians18. 
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This continuous contact between these communities gave birth between the 11th and 16th 
century to the Swahili culture, a mixture of Arab, Persian and Bantu elements which 
characterizes the Tanzanian society still today19. 
The first Europeans to set foot in Tanzania were Portuguese navigators guided by 
Vasco de Gama at the end of the 16th century.  In order to consolidate their trade power,  
within a few decades the Portuguese gained control of much of the coast, where for two 
centuries they ran a thriving trade of slaves and ivory. At the beginning of the 18th 
century, however, the Portuguese were forced to withdraw and hand over control of these 
territories to the Arabs20. 
If the coast of Tanzania was known to Europeans since the time of Portuguese 
colonization, the hinterland of the country was explored only from the mid-19th century 
on. During their exploration expeditions, Europeans began to forge relationships with 
local authorities and to exert an ever-increasing influence over them. The British, thanks 
to their naval power and the treaties stipulated with sultans administering the region, 
established an indirect dominion over Zanzibar and in the coastal areas. They were unable 
to extend control to the hinterland, where instead the Germans concluded several deals 
with local authorities21.  
In 1884-85 at the Berlin Conference eastern Africa was divided into spheres of 
influence among various European powers; German rule over the mainland of today-
Tanzania was sanctioned, while Great Britain took over Kenya and Uganda21. At first, the 
autochthonous communities tried to oppose the settlers and for some time they managed 
to stand up to the colonial powers, but they were eventually defeated. In Tanzania various 
indigenous groups rose against the Germans and only after 25 years of continuous wars 
did the European power manage to tame the resistance of local tribes22. 
After the First World War, Great Britain took over the administration of German 
East Africa, renamed Tanganyika, first as a League of Nations mandated territory and 
then as a United Nations trusteeship23.  
 
19 Ibidem. 
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Both the German and British administrations were harsh on local populations and 
often meant a regression from the social, economic, political and spiritual point of view24.  
European colonizers strongly weakened tribal societies, retaining only some 
organizational elements to more easily administer the territories under their control thanks 
to the help of local authorities25. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the idea of the right to self-
determination began to spread and Great Britain decided to give independence to India 
and other colonies to reduce the costs of managing colonialism. This gave a shred of hope 
to the Tanzanians, who started their struggle for independence26. In an attempt to release 
social tensions, Africans were offered the opportunity to join future legislative councils. 
It was at this point that in 1954 the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was 
founded under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. The British sought in various ways to 
thwart the growing influence of the TANU by proposing an alternative party, the United 
Tanganyika Party, and limiting the right to vote of Africans. Nevertheless, these efforts 
were futile in the elections of 1958, 1959 and 1960, the TANU recorded increasingly 
marked victories. As a result, Britain eventually granted independence to Tanganyika in 
196127.  
A slightly different story needs to be told about Zanzibar, the island part of 
Tanzania. Unlike Tanganyika, which underwent different occupations, between 1890 and 
1964 Zanzibar has always been under the British protectorate. At that time, the sultan was 
a puppet governor and the power was hold by the English consul in Zanzibar. In 1964 the 
oppressed workers and poor of Zanzibar rebelled against the British administration. To 
avoid the remembrance of the violent repression, diplomatic negotiations with the TANU 
were started, leading to the pact of union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar and the 
proclamation of the unified state of Tanzania some months later28. 
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In 1963 the principle of the one-party was adopted and the TANU dominated the 
political and social life of Tanzania until 1985, when Nyerere stepped down as a President 
of Tanzania29.  
Nyerere immediately made his political line clear in the Arusha Declaration of 
1967. This document stated that Tanzania was a ‘socialist State’ and announced that the 
main means of production would have been managed and controlled by the State30. In the 
following period, there was then substantial intervention in the domestic economy and 
Tanzania’s banks, insurance companies, plantations and large sectors of manufacturing 
were taken into public ownership31. Paradoxically, socialist programmes are traditionally 
based on industrialization and the denial of the great importance that imperialism gave to 
the primary sector.  The Arusha Declaration practically meant the opposite by affirming 
that it was agriculture the engine of Tanzania’s future prosperity, resuming thus elements 
of colonial policies32.  
With Nyerere’s departure in 1985, Tanzania has begun to move away from 
socialism33. In 1995 the single-party regime ended and multi-party elections took place, 
which were anyway won by the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the heir party of the 
TANU. The current president John Magufuli, who took office in 2015, is also a member 
of the CCM34. 
  
2.3 Land laws 
In the pre-colonial era, communal land ownership was widespread in Africa. As 
such, each community member had right to access and own a plot of land, which was 
allocated them by chiefs and tribe elders according to the area a person and his family 
could manage35. 
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Under the colonial rule, the first land tenure reforms were introduced and land 
ownership shifted to the hands of colonizers36.  In 1895, the Germans issued an Imperial 
Decree which declared all land, occupied or not, Crown land controlled by the German 
Empire37.  The only exception to this rule was in case individuals could prove their 
ownership through use and occupation or with documents38. In 1923, the British passed 
the Land Ordinance, which proclaimed land a public property under control of the  
colonial governor39. An amendment made in 1928 formally recognized customary rights 
to land40, creating a dualistic system of land governance, whereby rights granted by the 
state were functionally superior to customary rights41.  
Under the leadership of Nyerere, socialistic and nationalistic policies facilitated an 
increased centralized control over land42. In that period, it was carried out also a 
villagisation program with the aim of gathering rural people into villages, even by 
compulsion43. While this initiative proved to be quite successful44, vain was instead the 
attempt to create ujamaa vijijini, that is, villages in which communities work and farm 
cooperatively45.  
In the 1980s, the shift to liberalised economic policies facilitating private 
investments caused a boost in land purchases by domestic and foreign investors. This 
occurred in a context characterized by inefficient state bureaucracy and widespread 
confusion about land management, which fuelled rural discontent with the country’s land 
tenure policy and administration46. In response to growing tensions, a ‘Presidential 
Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters’, also known as the ‘Shivji Commission’, 
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carried out extensive and nationwide consultations in preparation for land reforms and 
published its findings in 1994. A new National Land Policy in 1995 and new land 
legislation in 1999 (Land Act No. 4 of 1999 and Village Land Act No. 5) followed, which, 
however, ignored most of the recommendations made by the Shivji Commission47. 
The National Land Policy of 1995 recognizes Tanzanian farmland as an abundant 
and underutilised commodity, that can thus be leased, rented or used as collateral when 
securing loans48. In this view, agricultural investments were strongly promoted and land 
should be transferred from the hands of less productive smallholder farmers to more 
efficient producers49. 
The logic of the National Land Policy was then followed in 1999 by Land Act No. 
4 and Village Land Act No. 5, which came both into force in May 200150 and regulate 
the existing land regime in Tanzania. 
The Land Act sets the overall framework legislation within which land 
administration is conducted. It establishes three basic categories of land (‘general’, 
‘reserved’ and ‘village’), their corresponding institutions and procedures for their 
management.  
The category of reserved land accounts for about 28% of the total land in 
Tanzania51 and is administered by sectoral government agencies52. It includes all land that 
is set aside by legislation as national parks, game reserves, forest reserves, marine 
reserves and so forth53.  
Village land is defined as the land within the demarcated or agreed boundaries of 
any of Tanzania’s 12,00054 villages55, which are in turn defined by local government 
legislations passed in the 1970s and early 1980s56, or as any land which villagers have 
been using or occupying for the past 12 years57. The lands falling into this category 
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compromises more than 70% of the national territory58 and are administered at grass-root 
level by Village Councils, the villages’ elected executive bodies.  To ensure that the 
Village Council is accountable to the villagers, its decisions in land management have to 
be approved also by the Village Assembly, that is another organ composed by the entire 
adult population of the village59. Nevertheless, some restrictions limit the managerial 
power of the villagers. The District Council and the Commissioner for Lands, for 
example, still have powers over the administration of village land and can strongly 
influence or even veto some decisions of the Village Council60.  
Finally, under the Village Land Act general land is “all public land which is not 
reserved land or village land”61. The Land Act, however, states that general land is “all 
public land which is not reserved land or village land and includes unoccupied or unused 
village land”62, an inconsistency which is significant in the context of transnational 
investments since it is only general land which can be leased out to foreign investors. 
General land covers approximately 2% of the national territory63 and is administered by 
the central Government through the Commissioner of Lands64. 
The Village Land Act instead specifically deals with the management and 
governance of village land. It determines how different land rights are protected, how 
they can be recorded and with what effects, sets parameters for the adjudication of land 
and it establishes the dispute settlement mechanism for resolving land disputes65. For 
management purposes, the act divides village land into three further categories: 
communal village land, land for individual use and land for future use. 
Communal village land is available for all villagers and people who have been 
permitted by the Village Assembly to use and occupy village land. These areas cannot be 
allocated to individual use and occupation and, as a consequence, cannot be made 
available to investors.  
Land for individual use is instead set aside and reserved for individual, family or 
group use. In this context, the term ‘group’ refers to a number of individuals who have 
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traditionally been using land together, such as pastoralists. Unlike communal village land, 
land for individual use can be allocated to outsiders by special arrangements.  
Finally, land for future use includes territories that have not yet been allocated for 
use by villagers (individually or collectively), but that are reserved for future use when 
the need arises. These lands cannot be made available to villagers for present time use, 
but can be leased to investors for a designated period and are the category of village land 
most likely to be allocated to outsiders66. 
All land in Tanzania is public land and vested in the President as a trustee on behalf 
of all citizens, who can access land through customary rights67. Although customary 
rights are granted the same legal status accorded to other land rights, they often enjoy 
weaker protection than titled property68 and it is thus better to document them by some 
form of title so that it is then easier to prove them in case they are contested. 
Tanzanian law allows registration and issue of employment titles to formalize land 
rights to individuals and groups: the Granted Right of Occupancy and the Certificate of 
Customary Right of Occupancy. 
The Granted Right of Occupancy refers to general land, often in urban areas69, and 
must always be accompanied by a clear term of occupancy70.  
The Certificate of Customary Right of Occupancy (CCRO), which is much more 
widespread, concerns village land71 and can be definite or indefinite in terms of the time 
of occupancy72. This title is released to individuals by village authorities once the 
government has demarcated the village boundaries and issued the Certificate of Village 
Land. Typically, CCROs have been issued to individuals in Tanzania, but since 2011 they 
have been extended also to different categories of ‘groups’ recognized by law. 
Specifically, those who are eligible for CCROs titles are registered groups (e.g. a 
formalized trust, society or community-based organization), traditional institutions (e.g. 
Maasai, traditional elders, ‘Ilaigwanak’) and some extraordinary ‘customary’ groups (e.g. 
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hunter-gatherers)73. CCROs represent for these individuals a valuable tool to formalize 
and strengthen their rights, especially for the social categories most vulnerable to land 
grabs and competing commercial interests. 
 
2.4 Initiatives to promote land investments  
The Tanzanian economy depends heavily on agriculture, which accounts for 29% 
of the GDP, employs over 65% of the labour force, provides 30% of the total export and 
65% of the raw materials consumed by domestic industries74. Moreover, it represents the 
primary source of livelihood for 80% of the population75 and provides more than 95% of 
the food consumed in the country76.  
Despite its role of primary importance in the life of Tanzanians and the domestic 
economy, the agricultural sector has persistently registered a lower growth rate compared 
to other sectors and productivity remains low77. Agriculture is dominated by small-scale 
farmers who cultivate plots of average size between 0.9 and 3 hectares and still adopt 
backwards farming techniques78. The Tanzanian Government is convinced that shifting 
towards agribusiness production and welcoming private investments are the best strategy 
to boost agricultural productivity, which would translate into sustained economic growth, 
poverty reduction and food security in the country. In order to reach these goals, various 
initiatives have been promoted, among which the most important are Kilimo Kwanza and 
SAGCOT. 
 
2.4.1 Kilimo Kwanza  
During the 1960s and 1990s, several attempts were made to implement the 
agricultural sector, but they all resulted unsuccessful also because they were highly 
centralized and with little involvement of the local population and the private sector79. 
Consequently, an alternative approach was sought and in 2009 the President Jakaya M. 
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Kikwete launched the initiative Kilimo Kwanza (‘Agriculture First’)80. The main feature 
that differentiates this action from past ones is precisely that it specifically aims to 
mobilize also the private sector by creating incentives for investments. 
The major goal of Kilimo Kwanza is to spur the growth of the agricultural sector 
and transform agriculture into a modern and commercial industry to increase food 
security and alleviate poverty. To this end, ten pillars which aim to curb the challenges 
facing Tanzanian agriculture have been defined. The first step to success would be to raise 
awareness and acceptance towards the adoption of the initiative by the population. 
Particular attention is paid to farmers, among whom awareness of the potential benefits 
from the initiative should raise. Of paramount importance is then the promotion and the 
establishment of different financial institutions to provide financial loans to farmers 
through the Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank and other entities. To allow 
smallholders to access forms of credit, it is necessary to formalize land rights, so that 
farmers can use their land as collateral when seeking loans to financial institutions. In an 
attempt to raise capital in the agricultural sector, incentive policies and regulations are 
also reviewed to attract local and foreign investors. Agriculture can become more 
effective by building and implementing infrastructures, such as roads, irrigation systems 
and storage facilities, and by adopting advanced technology. Crop yield are expected to 
increase also thanks to the evaluation of production priorities, that allows to identify 
which crops should farms produce. Industrialization of agricultural products would be 
another benchmark of commercial agriculture since it adds economic values to goods 
compared to raw materials. However, this action has not been possible because the 
reversals in agricultural processing industries are still limited and not very productive. 
Finally, good governance, coordination and evaluation of the milestones are also essential 
for these actions to be effective81.  
Despite all these efforts and instruments, the contribution of Kilimo Kwanza to 
the Tanzanian agriculture resulted to be lower than estimated. Crop yields have increased 
in many areas, but in other regions agriculture remains backwards and the rural population 
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is still experiencing regular food shortages. This happens because problems intended to 
be solved through Kilimo Kwanza still exist and, at the same time, others are coming as 
new challenges82. 
For the initiative to give the needed results some studies recommend the 
establishment of a strong economic base, which would facilitate the achievement of the 
intended goals, accompanied by good monitoring of the available resources and good 
governance. These are the fundamental actions to be taken to spearhead the growth of the 
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In May 2010, in a quest to implement Kilimo Kwanza, President Kikwete 
launched an ambitious public-private partnership program known as the Southern 
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). The intent is to boost agricultural 
productivity through agribusiness investments, and in so doing, improve food security, 
reduce rural poverty and promote environmental sustainability. The project was initiated 
in 2010 and its implementation period will run for 20 years up to 203084. 
SAGCOT aims to offer development potential by linking small-scale farmers with 
global agribusinesses especially through ‘nucleus farm and outgrower’ arrangements 
enabling small-scale farmers easier access to inputs, value-adding facilities, and 
markets85. The ultimate goal is to attract USD 2.1 billion of new agribusiness investment, 
bring 350,000 additional hectares into commercial production, incorporate Tanzanian 
smallholders into internationally competitive supply chains, create 420,000 new jobs and 
lift 2 million people out of poverty86. 
Projects falling within this initiative are concentrated in a corridor compounded 
by the southern highlands stretching from Dar es Salaam through Morogoro, Iringa and 
Mbeya to Sumbawanga, along which run also the main communication and energy routes 
of the country87. Within the SAGCOT corridor, six priority areas, termed ‘clusters’, have 
been identified. These are concentrated mainly in the vicinity of infrastructures, such as 
the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) system and the Port of Dar es 
Salaam, facilitating linkages to international markets for agricultural outputs and inputs. 
Theoretically, the development of the clusters should initially be driven by private 
investments, which should then translate into the creation of synergies across all 
components of the agricultural value chain88, achieving economies of scale and increasing 
efficiency89. 
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The SAGCOT region covers approximately 36.8 million hectares, that is nearly 
one-third of the country’s surface. Of this area, in 2012 38% was reserved land, 2% 
general land and 60% under village control.  To attract agribusiness investors, the 
government of Tanzania declared its intent to transfer about 18% of village land to the   
general land category, whose overall percentage would then raise to 20%90. It was not 
possible to find updated information about it and it is thus not possible to verify whether 
these interventions have been implemented or not. These are anyway significant figures, 
which highlight the extent to which the Tanzanian government is willing to go to facilitate 
commercial investments and how little is the interest in protecting its smallholders. 
In the SAGOT region, the government tries to promote the adoption of new 
technologies and marketing practices by smallholder farmers through expanding and 
establishing partnerships with private agribusiness companies91, which have the capacity 
to provide the inputs, processing facilities and infrastructures needed to link smallholders 
to domestic and global markets92. In particular, the Norwegian fertilizer company Yara 
International has allocated a substantial amount of capital to the construction of harbour 
facilities in Dar es Salaam to increase its handling efficiency. Improving the harbour 
facilities would go hand in hand with the fertilizer wholesale trade, a still limited market 
in Tanzania but expected to expand also thanks to a subsidy program to increase the use 
of fertilizers among farmers. This could be a win-win situation that would benefit 
agricultural development in Tanzania including both Yara and smallholder farmers, but 
since the subsidy program has not yet been evaluated its impact is still unknown93. 
Another element of the growth corridor approach is the warehouses and their 
receipt system. Thanks to licenses, producers can deposit their crop in warehouses and 
store them until prices are favourable. In addition, warehouse receipts can prove that 
goods are stored in the warehouse and can be used as collateral to borrow loans from 
banks. This system provides a potential to increase the negotiation power of the producers 
versus the traders as well as facilitate smallholders’ access to credit. However, even in 
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this system, some obstacles such as variable product quality, running costs, biological and 
man-made shrinkage, prevent from taking full advantage of the potential benefits94.  
Among the founding partners of SAGCOT are large companies, such as Unilever, 
Nestlé, Diageo, SAB Miller, Monsanto, Syngenta and Yara. However, the project is also 
supported by large donors such as governments and foundations95. This dominance of 
multinational companies is worrisome for the way they operate. In fact, being more 
productive than local companies, they are likely to outperform them and dominate the 
market, excluding smaller players. Furthermore, the common practice for multinationals 
is to establish large monoculture plantations, which have deep social and environmental 
impacts on the host region96.  
The overall initiative presents various criticisms and in 2013 it was classified by 
the World Bank as ‘high risk’. The main cause of concern is the presence within the 
SAGCOT region of vulnerable groups and indigenous people, the lack of consideration 
and recognition of their rights, the absence of planning and potential negative damages 
on environment97. These concerns appear to have come true, as reported by some 
studies98.  
 
2.5 Investments and land allocation procedures 
Tanzania is one of the African countries that has aroused great interest from 
foreign investors thanks to its vast plots of fertile farmland, rich bountiful resources and, 
as we have just seen, some initiatives promoted by the local government in the last years.  
This favourable and open environment has caused an upsurge in foreign 
investment inflows in the agricultural sector99, but it is difficult to quantify precisely how 
much land has been allocated to outsiders and how much capital has been generated. 
Official records in Tanzania are unclear, incomplete and often of limited reliability since 
different institutions at different levels of government are involved in the land allocation  
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process, but no coordinated storage or exchange of data is available. Many researchers 
have tried to overcome this lack of data by trying to gather first-hand information in the 
field, but it is clear that this is an extremely arduous task100. 
Under the Land Act, non-citizens are not allowed to own land in Tanzania, but 
may obtain user rights to land for investment purposes through a derivative title101.  Two 
main procedural paths can be used to obtain a plot of land in concession: through the 
Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) or village authorities.  
The TIC, established under the Investment Act of 1997102, is the government 
agency responsible for coordinating, encouraging, promoting and facilitating investment 
in Tanzania and to advise the Government on investment policy and related matters103. It 
plays a key role in identifying land available for investment (which is collected into a 
‘land bank’104), helps investors in obtaining all permits needed and guides them through 
the whole investment process105. Following this path, the investor has to propose an 
investment plan and submit his application to the TIC, in which the business idea is 
exposed. The TIC then verifies that the company fulfils certain requirements, such as 
business registration and investment capital, evaluates the project and approves or rejects 
the application. If the procedure is successful, the investor receives a Certificate of 
Incentive and must carry out a formal land survey of the area suitable for the investment. 
The land surveyed is then registered at the Ministry of Lands and the agricultural project 
is presented to the Ministry of Agriculture for registration. Finally, a Derivative of Rights 
for approved applications is registered and a Duplicate Derivative Title is transferred to 
the investor from the TIC106.  
The main problem with this procedure is that the land bank comprises only general 
land107, which, as mentioned above, only covers the 2% of the national territory, whereas 
agricultural investments require large chunks of land. Much of the land identified as 
suitable for investments is actually village land. As only general land can be leased to 
 
100 M. Locher and E. Sulle, Foreign land deals in Tanzania. An update and a critical view on the challenges 
of data (re)production, Brighton, The Hague, Cape Town and Itacha, LDPI, 2013, p. 2-3. 
101 United Republic of Tanzania, The Land Act No.4 of 1999, 20(1). 
102 Idem, Land Investment Act, No.27 of 1997, Dar es Salaam, 1997, s.2(4). 
103 www.tanzaniainvest.com [last accessed 30.09.2020]. 
104 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels, land access and rural livelihoods in Tanzania, p. 38.  
105 United Republic of Tanzania, Land Investment Act, No.27 of 1997, s.2(6). 
106 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels, land access and rural livelihoods in Tanzania, p. 40. 
107 Ivi, p. 38. 
 58 
foreign investors108, to obtain village land for investment, it must be first transferred to 
general land and only then investors can request Granted Rights of Occupancy over it.  In 
these cases, the investor must first identify, autonomously or with the help of local 
intermediates109, the land suitable for investment. Subsequently, they have to meet with 
the Village Council to begin negotiations and seek approval of the request for land. If the 
village land requested is less than 250 hectares in extent, then the Village Council can 
allocate the land directly to the investor with consultation and approval of the Village 
Assembly. For larger areas, however, the Village Assembly can only formulate some 
recommendations and it is the Minister of Lands that has to approve the proposed 
transfer110. Then, the President signs off on the transfer from village to general land. 
This procedure is made possible by the Village Land Act of 1999, which reserves 
the president the power to transfer any area of village land to general or reserved for 
public interest111. Since in the legislation there is no exact definition of public interest, it 
can be subject to arbitrary use by the president112. Finally, the investor receives a 
Derivative Granted Right of Occupancy to the land from the Commissioner of Lands113. 
This bottom-up process involves then different authorities and different levels of 
government and, for this reason, it is often lengthy and complex. 
The standard agricultural land lease lasts 99 years at 200 Tanzanian shillings (USD 
0.14) per hectare per year. Rental fees are collected by Ministry of Lands and are paid 
into government coffers114. 
The transfer from village land to general land is an expropriation perpetrated by 
the state itself, which extinguishes customary rights. Once the land has been converted 
and granted to an investor, at the end of the concession or if the project fails or is 
abandoned, the title reverts to the TIC115. The lands remain thus under the control of the 
central government and do not return under the administration of the village authorities. 
 
108 United Republic of Tanzania, The Land Act No.4 of 1999, s.22(1)(b); s.25(1)(h).  
109 G.E. Massay and T. Kassile, Land-based Investments in Tanzania. Legal Framework and Realities on 
the Ground, Brighton, The Hague, Cape Town and Itacha, LDPI, 2014, p. 8. 
110 United Republic of Tanzania, The Village Land Act No.5 of 1999, s. 4(6). 
111 Ivi, s. 4(9). 
112 M. Bergius, Large Scale Agro Investments for Biofuel Production in Tanzania. Impact on Rural 
Households, Institute of Development Studies, University of Agder, 2012, p. 17. 
113 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels, land access and rural livelihoods in Tanzania, pp. 40-41. 
114 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Case study: Tanzania, p. 11. 
115 United Republic of Tanzania, The Land Act No.4 of 1999, s.19(5). 
 59 
There are three other alternative procedures that investors can use to access land, 
that is, through sub-leases from the private sector, through licenses from the Government 
or through purchase from other holders of a Granted Right of Occupancy116. However, 
these procedures are rarely adopted.  
 
Figure 2.3 and Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present a broad overview of the transnational 
land deals in Tanzania of April 2020. The projects of foreign investors are mainly 
concentrated in two geographical areas, namely in the plains along the coast and in the 
SAGCOT corridor, both areas with a proximity to freshwater resources and 
infrastructures. Deals vary greatly in size, raging from a few hundred hectares to tens of 
thousands. In this regard, however, it is important to note that on average investors obtain 
only about 58% of the intended size. Of the concluded deals, just over half of the projects 
are active while the percentage of projects that failed for various reasons, such as financial 
issues, bankruptcy of the company or resistance of the local communities, is 
significant. Focusing on the aim of the investment of concluded deals, it can be noted that 
food crops concern the largest number of deals and the largest size under contract. Biofuel 
crops, livestock and non-food agricultural commodities follow then by number of deals, 
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Tab. 2.4 - Status of land deals. 
(Source: www.landmatrix.org) 
 












  Not started 
 
2 3% 12,132 
 
1% 
  Start-up (no production) 
 
3 5% 5,744 
 
>1% 
  In operation (production) 
 
24 35% 166,503 
 
18% 
  Abandoned 
 
9 13% 641,31 
 
7% 
  None 5 8% 112,217 
 
12% 
  Tot. concluded 
 
43 64% 359,604  38% 
  Expression of interest 
 
5 7% 74,304 
 
8% 
  Memorandum of 
Understanding 
 
2 3% 30,000 
 
3% 
  Under negotiation 
 
5 7% 100,000 
 
11% 
  Tot. intended 
 
12 17% 204,304 22% 
  Negotiation failed 
 
9 13% 335,000 
 
36% 
  Contract cancelled 
 
4 6% 34,517 
 
4% 
  Tot. failed 
 
13 19% 369,517 40% 


















































 Food crops 
 
27 41% 124,642 21% 
 Biofuels 
 
9 14% 74,831 13% 
 Livestocks 
 
7 11% 50,278 9% 
 Non-food agricultural 
commodities 
 
6 9% 11,611 2% 
 Agriculture unspecified 
 
4 6% 9,173 2% 
 Timber plantation (for wood 
and fibre) 
 
4 6% 105,635 18% 
 Renewable energy 
 
3 5% 24,906 4% 
 For carbon 
sequestration/REDD 
 
2 3% 71,291 12% 
 Turism 
 
2 3% 44,000 8% 
 Forest logging/management 
(for wood and fibre) 
 
1 1% 61,291 11% 
 Conservation 
 
1 1% 1,999 >1% 
  Tot.: 66 
 
























2.5.1 Community consultations 
Although Tanzania has one of the most progressive legislations in Africa in 
regards to community consent to land transfers, the community consultation process is 
often unsatisfactory and only partially implemented117. In consultation meetings, villagers 
tend to act merely as bystanders while investors highlight the positive potential benefits 
that their project will bring them. Communities are systematically kept in the dark about 
possible negative consequences of the proposed investment and, therefore, do not have 
complete and exhaustive information that allows them to make conscious choices118. 
Rarely villagers can fully realize the value of their land due to an inefficient 
informative system for land administration119. The vast majority of villagers perceive 
their land as a valueless, abundant resource120 and, given their poverty, the promises of 
job opportunities, social services and infrastructure pledged by the investors sound more 
appealing than holding rights to farmland121. 
In encouraging smallholders to accept offers from investors and hand over their 
plots, plays a role also the government itself, which instead of defending the rights of its 
own population chooses to protect the interest of investors122. 
Moreover, promises made are primarily verbal and rarely formal contracts are 
signed between the affected community and the foreign investor. In absence of an official 
document, it is then arduous for anyone to hold the investors accountable in case the 





117 S. Vermeulen and L. Cotula, “Over the heads of local people: consultation, consent, and recompense in 
large-scale land deals for biofuels projects in Africa”, The Journal of Peasant Studies 37:4 (2010), p. 909. 
118 H. Theting and B. Brekke, Land Investments or Land Grab? A critical view from Tanzania and 
Mozambique, Oslo, Spire, 2010, p.13. 
119 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa, p. 26. 
120 N. Habib-Mintz, “Biofuel investment in Tanzania. Omissions in implementation”, Energy Policy 38:8 
(2010) p. 5. 
121 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa, p. 26 
122 E. Haulle, Assessment of Communities` Coping mechanisms to Geodisaster Risks in the Vicinity of 
Oldoinyo Lengai in Northern Tanzania, PhD Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 2014, quoted in E. 
Haulle, “Land Resource In Tanzania: Whose State, Whose Resource?”, International Journal of Social 
Science Studies 3:6 (2015), p. 77. 
123 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa, pp. 26-27. 
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2.5.2 Compensation practices 
Tanzanian legislation entitles to “full, fair and prompt compensation to any person 
whose right of occupancy or recognized long-standing occupation or customary use of 
land is revoked” for lands converted into general land124. The type, amount, method and 
timing of the payment must be agreed upon by the Village Council and the Commissioner 
of Lands125. 
The reality of the facts, however, is more complicated and many practical 
problems surround compensation practices. First of all, compensation is only extended to 
individuals who can demonstrate they had active farming activities or other fixed assets 
in the area under question126. Holders of secondary land rights, such as those relating to 
grazing, hunting and access to forest resources, water and wood supply, are instead 
excluded from the compensation payment127. Moreover, land within village boundaries 
is sometimes considered de facto general land, which can thus be leased out without the 
need for compensation. As mentioned earlier, while the Village Land Act defines general 
land as “all public land which is not reserved or village land”, in the Land Act this 
category is defined as “all public land which is not reserved land or village land and 
includes unoccupied or unused village land”128.  No definition is offered for ‘unoccupied’ 
or ‘unused’ land. These apparently-idle territories may be used for various economic 
activities by local communities or saved for future generations, but on a formal level they 
are recognized as general land, which can be freely leased out to outside investors. Laws 
can thus facilitate grabbing of village land instead of recognizing the customary rights of 
the rural population, who are expropriated of their land without receiving any 
compensation for the loss suffered129. 
If any compensation is paid, communities have rarely been adequately rewarded 
in relation to the value of their lands130 and in any case compensations do not replace the 
loss of land assets, which represent the primary and irreplaceable source of livelihoods 
 
124 United Republic of Tanzania, The Land Act No.4 of 1999, s. 1(1)(g) and United Republic of Tanzania, 
The Village Land Act No.5 of 1999, s.3(1)(h). 
125 Idem, The Village Land Act No.5 of 1999, s. 4(8)(a). 
126 Idem, The Land Act No.4 of 1999, part 1, s. 1(2). 
127 K. Deininger, D. Byerlee, J. Lindsay, A. Norton, H. Selod and M. Stickler, Rising Global Interest in 
Farmland. Can it yield sustainable and equitable benefits?, World Bank, Washington DC, 2010, p.108. 
128 See p. 49. 
129 Bergius, Large Scale Agro Investments for Biofuel Production in Tanzania, p. 17. 
130 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels, land access and rural livelihoods in Tanzania, p. 51. 
 65 
for rural populations. Furthermore, the compensation procedure is associated with high 
transaction costs, which limits maximization of the wellbeing of the affected parties, and 
involves middlemen whose priority is financial gain and have thus little interest in 
protecting the interests of local communities131. Numerous cases have also been 
documented in which the compensation process has failed to follow the established 
procedures. For example, sometimes communities have been paid only after the land has 
been transferred to general land and leased out to the foreign company, whereas by law 
the payment should precede the conversion of the land132.   
 
2.5.3 The Maasai 
One of the most vulnerable groups at risk of losing their land are pastoralists, who 
represent about 10% of the whole Tanzanian population133. Besides being socially and 
politically marginalized across Tanzania as a whole, their seasonal grazing patterns can 
lead to the misperception that their community land is unused and available for alternative 
purposes134.  
The most known and biggest pastoralist community in Tanzania are the Maasai, a 
semi-nomadic ethnic group based for centuries in the Great Rift Valley, between Northern 
Tanzania and Southern Kenya135. In the past, they flourished in the region, but since the 
arrival of the European colonizers their landholdings have been previously squeezed and 
their existence has been seriously threatened136.  They are traditionally dedicated to 
pastoralism, but as many cattle have been ravaged by disease and access to grassland has 
been compromised, they have started relying on subsistence agriculture to supplement 
their diet138.  
Especially since the mid-20th century, a series of laws and ordinances aimed at 
environmental preservation dispossessed the Maasai of vast areas of their traditional land, 
such as the area of today-Serengeti National Park. Recently, with ecotourism becoming  
the fastest growing sector within the tourism industry, important economic interests have 
 
131 Massay and Kassile, Land-based Investments in Tanzania, p.12. 
132 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels, land access and rural livelihoods in Tanzania, p. 54. 
133 A. Mittal and E. Fraser, Losing the Serengeti. The Maasai land that was to run forever, The Oakland 
Institute, 2018, p. 10. 
134 www.ujamaa-crt.org [last accessed 30.09.2020]. 
135 Cotula, The great African land grab?, p. 20. 
136 Mittal and Fraser, Losing the Serengeti, p. 11. 
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also been added to concerns for the protection of the environment and wildlife137. At first, 
the Maasai were offered to relocate to neighbouring regions and were promised various 
forms of indirect compensation for losing their land, but in the following years legislation 
reforms evicted them even from these territories and the promises remained unfulfilled 
or only partially realized138.  Bans on cultivation within certain areas and restrictions on 
access to grazing lands have further jeopardized Maasai’s food security, who in some 
areas suffer from high levels of malnutrition. The situation becomes particularly critical 
in times of drought, during which numerous deaths from starvation are registered139. 
Paradoxically, while conservation strategies have often involved the displacement 
of indigenous groups, studies show that pastoral communities are often superior to 
governments when it comes to conservation and securing their land rights would be the 
best way to preserve nature. Since Maasai’s subsistence is entirely dependent on the 
thriving surrounding ecosystems, this group has developed a lifestyle based on the care 
and conservation of the environment they inhabit140.   
Not only their role as environmental guardians has still failed to gain due 
recognition, but the Tanzanian government has failed to protect Maasai’s rights and their 
lifestyle has even been accused of being harmful to the environment. In 2005, for 
example, the then-president Kikwete stated a zero-tolerance position on traditional 
pastoralism, declared incompatible with the goals of modernizing the agricultural sector. 
According to the government, pastoralism degrades vast tracts of land, is characterized 
by very low productivity levels and invades established farms, ranches, forests, and 
wildlife conservation areas. Pastoralists should, therefore, abandon their nomadic lifestyle 
to sedentarize and change their production system into a ranching system141. After some 
failed attempts, the Tanzanian government is seeking once again to promote modernized 
cattle ranches through SAGCOT projects, but the strategy does not seem to have the 
desired effects142. 
 
137 Ivi, p. 7. 
138 Cotula, The great African land grab?, pp. 20-21. 
139 Mittal and Fraser, Losing the Serengeti, p. 29.  
140 www.iwgia.org [last accessed 30.09.2020]. 
141 R. Odgaard, Land Rights and Land Conflicts in Tanzania: A Case Study, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Denmark and DIIS, 2006, pp. 21-22. 
142 Maganga et al., “Dispossession through Formalization: Tanzania and the G8 Land Agenda in Africa”, 
p. 25.  
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In addition to conservation laws, more threats to their existence derive from 
foreign investments. As mentioned before, large-scale agricultural projects occupy land 
formally deemed idle or marginal, meaning that is not settled on or farmed. However, 
these seemingly unused territories can be exploited by shepherds for seasonal grazing or 
access to water sources. Moreover, and use patterns adopted by pastoral communities, 
such as seasonal grazing, typically entail leaving little mark on the environment. Hence, 
their ownership claims are harder to prove and are particularly vulnerable to 
dispossession143. 
For centuries, the Maasai and numerous indigenous groups worldwide have lived 
in situations dominated by hunger, poverty, displacement, violence and discrimination. 
These struggles, combined with the policies adopted in the last decades in the name of 
environmental conservation and modernization of the agricultural sector, are putting the 
Maasai at risk of wiping out, which would mean an incredible loss not only socially, but 
also in terms of culture, knowledge, tradition, language, lifestyle and stewardship.  
 
















































3.1 Sun Biofuels 
 
The transnational land deal in Tanzania that has received most international 
research and media attention and which has been object of most research is undoubtedly 
that of Sun Biofuels Ltd, a UK-based company which widely invested in biofuels crops 
in eastern and southern Africa1. In Tanzania, the company entered in 2005 through the 
local affiliate Sun Biofuels Tanzania Ltd with the intent to invest around UDS 20,000,000 
to establish a jatropha2 plantation and a processing plant in the Kisarawe District3.  
The District is located in a strategic position which offers untapped potential for 
agro-industry development. It lies about 70 kilometres southeast of Dar es Salaam, is 
served by two railroad lines and is surrounded by three large rivers, though inaccessible 
for agriculture due to poor water management. The district has a total population of about 
100,000 inhabitants, who live in conditions of extreme poverty with a per capita income 
equal to half the national average. About 80% of the local population is engaged in 
agriculture, but the sector remains particularly backward and inefficient. The hinterland 
is inaccessible by traders due to lack of appropriate transport infrastructures and some 
production inputs, such as fertilizers, credit or expansion services, are underdeveloped or 
missing. As a result, crops yields have been progressively dropping and only 4% of the 
farmers have access to any kind of agricultural inputs. Moreover, between 2005 and 2008 
local market prices for basic food crops doubled. Without additional purchasing power, 
 
1 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels Investment and Community Land Tenure in Tanzania, p. 12. 
2 Jatropha curcas, commonly known as jatropha, is a species of the Euphorbia family originally from Latin 
America, but which has long been planted also in Africa and Asia as a protective hedge around homesteads, 
gardens and fields, since it is poisonous and not browsed by animals. An oft-quoted advantage of jatropha 
is its capacity to grow in difficult conditions including arid and otherwise non-arable areas. However, as 
any other plant, jatropha does flourish better in more fertile soils, and for this reason a number of large-
scale investors have acquired land for jatropha cultivation in relatively fertile areas. Currently jatropha is 
being widely promoted throughout Tanzania for small and large-scale projects to produce biodiesel.  
Source: Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels Investment and Community Land Tenure in Tanzania, pp. 21-23. 
3 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Tanzanian villagers pay for Sun 
Biofuels investment disaster, 2012, p. 3. 
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Fig.3.1 - Location of the Kisarawe District. 
(Source: adapted from Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels, land access and rural livelihoods in Tanzania, p. 11) 
 
 
The company identified the target area in 2006 with the help of a local Member of 
Parliament5, who was a strong advocate of the project6. Since the targeted territory was 
village land, in the first place Sun Biofuels had to approach the 11 villages surrounding 
the project area and convince their 11,277 inhabitants to cede their land7.  
During the consultation meetings, the investor offered financial compensation, 
new job opportunities (the number of promised jobs reported by different sources varies 
 
4 Habib-Mintz, “Biofuel investment in Tanzania”, p. 6. 
5 F. De Blasis, “Investimenti esteri e agricoltura in Tanzania: land grabbing o sviluppo rurale? Il caso Sun 
Biofuels nel distretto di Kisarawe”, Afriche e Orienti 18:1 (2016), p. 148. 
6 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels, land access and rural livelihoods in Tanzania, p. 48. 
7 global.mongabay.com/news/bioenergy/ [last accessed 15.10.2020]. 
with regional and district officials. Detailed interviews with representatives of
the private sector included those with FELISA in Kigoma, SEKAB BT based in
Dar es Salaam and Diligent based in Arusha. Some of the other companies’
representatives were met during various workshops and meetings in Arusha
and Dar es Salaam, and these encounters were used as opportunities for
informal discussions. 
In total, 78 people were formally interviewed in both central and local
government offices, NGOs, private companies, and residents of selected
villages (see Annex). 
11
FIGURE 1. MAP OF CASE STUDY AREAS (CASE STUDY DISTRICTS
HIGHLIGHTED)
Kigoma Region: Kigoma Rural District. 
Arusha Region: Monduli District; Arumeru District. 
Manyara Region: Babati District.
Coast Region: Bagamoyo District; Kisarawe District; Rufiji District.
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from 7008 and 5,0009), three water wells, a local dispensary, improved schools, health 
clinics and roads10. These promises remained verbal only and were never codified in a 
written formal contract11, making it hard to hold the company accountable for its failure 
to fulfil them. 
Very few community members were sceptical with the project. Some of them had 
heard that jatropha was a crop harmful to soil and water resource, others were questioning 
the real benefits that the company could provide12. Nevertheless, the vast majority of 
Village Assemblies members voluntarily approved the land transfer and welcomed the 
investment as they were assured that it could significantly improve their poor livings and 
boost local economy13. 
Already in the consultation process, critical issues can be identified. First of all, 
only one-side information was given to the local communities; whereas benefits were 
widely advertised, potential disadvantages were not presented to villagers. District 
officials in Kisarawe declared that, since some of the village members had been involved 
in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)14, they were aware of the possible 
negative outcomes, but at the same time officers themselves also admitted that this aspect 
was not openly exhibited to the communities during consultation meetings15. Another 
problem regards the procedure followed during consultations. Encounters with investors 
and district officials were described by villagers as information meetings rather than 
 
8 www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/oct/30/africa- poor-west-biofuel-betrayal [last accessed 
15.10.2020]. 
9 De Blasis, “Investimenti esteri e agricoltura in Tanzania: land grabbing o sviluppo rurale?”, p. 148. 
10 S. Gabrielsson and G. Massay, A hunger for justice. Tracing the exclusion of small-scale farmers in the 
race for farmland in Tanzania. Lund and Dar es Salaam, Lund University Centre for Sustainability Studies 
and Land Rights Research and Resources Institute, 2014,  p. 12; De Blasis, “Investimenti esteri e agricoltura 
in Tanzania: land grabbing o sviluppo rurale?”, p. 148 and The Oakland Institute, Understanding land 
investment deals in Africa. Tanzanian villagers pay for Sun Biofuels investment disaster, p. 3.  
11 Gabrielsson and Massay, A hunger for justice, pp.  13-14. 
12 E. Haulle, “Community Awareness and their Response to Biofuel Production in Tanzania. A Case of 
Kisarawe and Singida Districts”, International Journal of Research in Pharmacy and Biosciences 2:5 
(2015), p. 53 
13 Gabrielsson and Massay, A hunger for justice, p. 12. 
14 The Environmental Impact Assessment is a process of evaluating the environmental, social and economic 
impacts of a proposed project or development prior to decision-making. It aims to predict negative 
outcomes at an early stage in project planning and design, in order to find ways and means to reduce adverse 
impacts.  
Source: www.cbd.int/impact/whatis.shtml [last accessed 15.10.2020]. 
15 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Tanzanian villagers pay for Sun 
Biofuels investment disaster, p. 4. 
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negotiations. Local people were not used to this type of mediation and such as an 
approach created an asymmetric power relation, where villagers were put in a weaker 
position16. Furthermore, it appears that only a small number of community members 
attended the meetings. In the village of Mtamba, for example, only 76 individuals took 
part in the consultation meeting with the company out of a total population of over 1,000 
inhabitants17. 
Initially, Sun Biofuels applied for 20,000 hectares of land18, but the TIC granted a 
derivate title for a 99-year lease over only 8,21119. In 2009 production operations started 
and an area of 2,000 hectares was planted with jatropha20. 
 




16 Ivi, p. 3. 
17 De Blasis, “Investimenti esteri e agricoltura in Tanzania: land grabbing o sviluppo rurale?”, p. 149. 
18 global.mongabay.com/news/bioenergy/ [last accessed 15.10.2020]. 
19 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Tanzanian villagers pay for Sun 
Biofuels investment disaster, p. 3. 





Fig. 3.3 - One-year jatropha cultivation at the Sun Biofuels plantation. 
(Source: The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Tanzanian villagers pay for 





The land leased to Sun Biofuel was mostly common forest land and, to a lesser 
extent, agricultural and residential areas21. Local communities used forests for several 
activities, including grazing, charcoal production and harvesting of timber, firewood, 
wild-food, fodder and medicine. These activities enabled to diversify the diet and sources 
of income beyond agriculture, with some households claiming that up to 70% of their 
domestic income depended on forest resources22. Since only a limited extent of the land 
affected by the investment was farmland, food security and domestic food production 
were not seriously compromised23. 
Another urgent question concerns access to water supplies. Even before the arrival 
of Sun Biofuels the area was water-scarce, as evidenced by the EIA conducted before the 
investment. For this reason, it was prompted that the plantation should not cover any key 
water source used by the local population, yet these recommendations were ignored. 
Whereas prior to the investment water supplies were freely available to all and within a 
 
21 Ivi, pp. 150-151. 
22 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Tanzanian villagers pay for Sun 
Biofuels investment disaster, p. 4. 
23 M. Purdon, Land and Sustainable Industrial Policy in sub-Saharan Africa. The Relationship between 
Land Tenure and Foreign Investment Strategy in Uganda and Tanzania, London, Department of 
International Development London School of Economics, p. 37. 
 74 
maximum 30-minute walk, now for some villagers the nearest water source is about 10 
kilometres away24.  
Once people lost access to their land, forest and water sources, they had to start 
buying food, water and other products they used to collect freely. Moreover, the prices of 
some commodities have increased as they need to be transported for longer distances. The 
alternative option to relying on the market is spending a considerable amount of time 
going to distant areas and collect the products needed25. Since women are the main 
responsible for the collection of these resources, their work burden has increased as they 
have to travel further to obtain them26. Concurrently, if domestic expenditures have 
increased, on the other hand revenues have diminished. The time that could be allocated 
on farming activities has been reduced and thus a smaller share of agricultural products 
is available for sale, further lowering household income27. These changes deeply affected 
food consumption patterns of rural people, who spend a significant percentage of their 
income on food purchase28. 
However, some families have benefited from this situation. These are mainly high-
income households who often include small-scale vendors of basic food items. As a 
consequence of the decrease in local agricultural productivity and trade intensification 
through the area following the investment, these families have been experiencing positive 
linkage effects and increased sales through their businesses. A similar trend was observed 
in the sale of agricultural products among households with farms in the vicinity of the 
roads running through the villages29. Hence, social inequalities among the rural 
population have fostered due to the thriving of best-resourced families and the 
simultaneous further impoverishment of low-income villagers30. 
As for the environmental damage, it is difficult to criticize the impact of the biofuel 
project as the land allocated had already been heavily degraded and over-exploited by 
dense human population and charcoal and firewood production31. 
 
24 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Tanzanian villagers pay for Sun 
Biofuels investment disaster, p. 5. 
25 Ivi, pp. 4-5. 
26 Gabrielsson and Massay, A hunger for justice, p. 15. 
27 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Tanzanian villagers pay for Sun 
Biofuels investment disaster, pp. 4-5. 
28 Ivi, p. 4. 
29 Ivi, p. 5. 
30 Ibidem. 
31 Purdon, Land and Sustainable Industrial Policy in sub-Saharan Africa, p. 38. 
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In 2013, eight years after signing the contract, Sun Biofuels earmarked USD 
25,000 as compensation32 to the District Council33, who in turn retained a 75% cut for 
itself and distributed the remaining 25% between villages34. Only 152 individuals 
received compensation for the land loss suffered, while the remaining did not obtain 
any35. Furthermore, the promises made by Sun Biofuels to the communities remained 
unfulfilled. For example, the water wells construction begun but was not finished and 
water is lacking in the ground36. 
 One promise that was kept dealt with the employment generation, as in the 
production phase between 2009 and 2011 Sun Biofuels employed approximately 750 
people37. The company hired both contract and casual workers. The former were in turn 
divided between supervisors and unskilled workers. The supervisors were in charge of 
coordinating, supervising and assisting the low-skilled workers and received a salary of 
USD 86. The unskilled workers, who made up the vast majority of employees, engaged 
in farming activities and earned about USD 45 per month for 50 hours of work per week. 
Casual labourers received a wage just over USD 2 per day and were not entitled to certain 
benefits such as health insurance or severance pay. These salaries were higher than the 
minimum wage of agricultural workers in the rest of the country, which stands at USD 
3038. However, cases have been reported in which workers were not paid the full 
severance pay39 or wages were not sufficient for purchasing food and covering other basic 
expenses. In particular, households with only one member employed at the plantation and 
with little workforce available to work their land were particularly food insecure40. 
Moreover, workers often used part of their salary on-site at the plantation to meet their 
own needs in terms of food and water, leaving them with less money to bring home41.  
 
32 Massay and Kassile, Land-based Investments in Tanzania., p. 12. 
33 German et al., “Contemporary processes of large-scale land acquisition by investors”, p. 26. 
34 Gabrielsson and Massay, A hunger for justice, p. 14. 
35 J. Cleaver, R. Schram and G. Wanga, Bioenergy and Food Security. The BEFS Analysis for Tanzania, 
Rome, FAO, 2010, p 40. 
36 Gabrielsson and Massay, A hunger for justice, p. 4. 
37 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Tanzanian villagers pay for Sun 
Biofuels investment disaster, p. 5. 
38 De Blasis, “Investimenti esteri e agricoltura in Tanzania: land grabbing o sviluppo rurale?”, p. 151. 
39 www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/oct/30/africa-poor-west-biofuel-betrayal [last accessed 
15.10.2020]. 
40 De Blasis, “Investimenti esteri e agricoltura in Tanzania: land grabbing o sviluppo rurale?”, p. 154. 
41 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Tanzanian villagers pay for Sun 
Biofuels investment disaster, p. 6. 
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Working conditions at the plantation were also criticized. Some former employees 
complained about excessive workload, poor sanitary conditions, lack of training in the 
use of chemicals42 and protective equipment, with consequent damage to health43. 
In cases where one or more household members had been hired at the plantation, 
work dynamics on the farmland remained under villagers’ control changed profoundly. 
Before the investment, the land used to be cultivated by all family members, but once 
employed by the company farmers could no longer take care of their land due to lack of 
time and energy. A minority of the workers could use the wages received from Sun 
Biofuels to take on their own workforce in family lands and thus micro-income circuits 
were introduced, which stimulated the rural labour market. In most cases, however, there 
was a decline in manpower or the land was completely abandoned44. 
Job opportunities also attracted a substantial number of farmers from other 
districts; some of whom were hired on the jatropha plantation, while others were 
employed on the family lands of Sun Biofuels workers living in the area.  This influx of 
new people raised the demand for commodities, stimulating the local market. The income 
circuits introduced, together with the arrival of new inhabitants, had a positive impact on 
the local economy and benefits also fell on those who were not directly employed by the 
company45. 
Sun Biofuels was unable to raise the capital to fully implement the project and 
declared bankruptcy in 2011. The activity on the plantation shrunk sharply, to the point 
that only 35 employed remained46. Most of the workers remained are security guards, 
whose main task is to prevent villagers from accessing the land47. Indeed, as mentioned 
in the previous chapter, once the rural communities are expropriated of their village land 






42 De Blasis, “Investimenti esteri e agricoltura in Tanzania: land grabbing o sviluppo rurale?”, p. 152. 
43 www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/oct/30/africa-poor-west-biofuel-betrayal [last accessed 
15.10.2020].  
44 De Blasis, “Investimenti esteri e agricoltura in Tanzania: land grabbing o sviluppo rurale?”, p. 153. 
45 Ibidem. 
46 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Tanzanian villagers pay for Sun 
Biofuels investment disaster, p. 6. 
47 Ivi, p. 7. 
48 See p. 58-59. 
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Few months after the abandonment of the project, Thirty Degrees East, a private 
company registered in Mauritius, bought 90% of Sun Biofuels shares with the intent to 
raise the financial capital needed and proceed with the project. The remaining 10% of the 
shares is controlled by Harbert Marwa and Daudi Mwakabore, two Tanzanian investors49. 
This change in ownership occurred without the knowledge of the villages or the district 
commissioner50. Since Thirty Degrees East took over Sun Biofuels, for some time the 
new investors were in the process of reviewing their strategy and business plan for the 
plantation51, but to date there is no notification that operations were resumed. As the new 
owners do not have any responsibilities to maintain the promises made in the previous 
agreement, most likely the projects promised by Sun Biofuels will never be realized52. 
 
49 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Tanzanian villagers pay for Sun 
Biofuels investment disaster, p. 6. 
50 Gabrielsson and Massay, A hunger for justice, p. 14. 
51 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Tanzanian villagers pay for Sun 
Biofuels investment disaster, p. 6. 





Fig. 3.5 - Project site of EcoEnergy in the Bagamoyo District. 
(Source: United Republic of Tanzania, Bagamoyo Sugar Infrastructure and Sustainable Community 




7.  ESIA have been carried out and approved both for the estate and 
the outgrower programme. An environmental certi!cate was 
issued in 2009 by GoT and updated in 2011/2012. The ESIA for the 
outgrower programme was approved in August 2015. Both GoT and 
AfDB have con!rmed that the ESIAs for the nucleus estate and 
outgrower programme are in line with national and international 
environmental and social standards. 
8.  BEE had also taken adequate measures to safeguard the environ-
ment and water availability in the Wami River. Sugar cane planta-
tions may develop into monocultures; therefore the project had a de-
veloped strategy for biodiversity conservation. It was also designed 
for two forestation programs: one for protection of the river bank 
and one for demonstration of sustainable commercial forestry with-
in the project area. Overall the BEE project would have minimized 
greenhouse gas emissions, mitigated climate change challenges, 
maximized production of renewable energy and promoted positive 
social impacts. 
9.  Taking socioeconomic aspects into considerations, BEE had decided 
that instead of building a camp within the estate, 90 percent of the 
approximate 2300 direct employees at the nucleus estate would be 
living in or near surrounding communities in order to strengthen 
these communities rather than developing “an island of wealth 
surrounded by an ocean of poverty”. Both women and men would 
have been employed in order to create a better local gender balance 
compared to other similar projects. Additionally, all employees were 
to be served a nutritious meal six days a week. 
10.  During 2011-2015 farmers in nearby villages received training in 
how to become commercial farmers through learning how to cooper-
ate in larger groups and using irrigation. This was planned to be a 
foundation for creating wealth in the district through offering gen-
uine local business opportunities and foster local entrepreneurship. 
With the high productivity that the outgrower project was designed 
to achieve, local farmers, through their outgrower companies, were 
to earn much higher incomes than what comparable sugarcane 
farmers currently are paid in Tanzania and East Africa.
Project site in Bagamoyo District, United Republic of Tanzania
Source: Bagam yo Sugar I frastructure and Sustainable Community Development 
Programme (BASIC Programme), Detailed design report, IFAD 31 Dec 2014.
United Republic of Tanzania 
Bagamoyo Sugar Infrastructure and Sustainable Community Development Programme (BASIC) 








The second case study examines the USD 500,000,000 sugarcane project by 
Bagamoyo EcoEnergy Ltd, that is a subsidiary of the Swedish-owned private company 
EcoEnergy Africa AB53. The project was part of the SAGCOT partnership54.  
The land targeted for the investment is located in the Bagamoyo District, which 
lies about 70 kilometres north of Dar Es Salaam. In 2006 the land was initially allocated 
to the Swedish company SEKAB Bioenergy Tanzania Ltd for biofuel sugarcane 
production, but the project soon failed due to a scandal over a doctored EIA55. Bagamoyo 
EcoEnergy Ltd then picked up where the attempt left and bought the plans and investment 
license from SEKAB to form its own project. Subsequently, neighbouring villages were 
approached to grant additional land to the foreign company56.  
In 2013 EcoEnergy was granted a 99-year lease to 24,000 hectares for industrial 
sugarcane production. In exchange, the Government of Tanzania were to be given an 
equity share in the company, significant tax revenues, and, once the land would have been 
delivered without any encumbrance, the payment of a rent of USD 30,000 per year57.  
EcoEnergy and the Tanzanian government declared that the investment would 
have brought many benefits also to the local people. According to company estimates, 
the project would have employed about 2,000 new workers, benefited 1,500 outgrowers, 
created 11,000 –15,000 new jobs indirectly, and injected USD 45 to 50 million a year into 
the local economy58. However, since the contract has never been made public, it is 
impossible to know fiscal details, contractual and legal safeguards or obligations of the 












53 Action Aid, Take Action: Stop EcoEnergy’s Land Grab in Bagamoyo, Tanzania, Johannesburg, 2015, p. 
12. 
54 www.sagcot.com/our-partners/sagcot-partners/ [last accessed 15.10.2020].  
55 www.pambazuka.org/global-south/biofuels-and-neo-colonialism [last accessed 15.10.2020].  
56 Action Aid, Take Action: Stop EcoEnergy’s Land Grab in Bagamoyo, p. 13. 
57 EcoEnergy Ldt, White Paper on the Bagamoyo EcoEnergy Project in Tanzania, p. 5. 
58 www.ecoenergy.co.tz/resource-center/faq/ [last accessed 15.10.2020].  
59 Action Aid, Take Action: Stop EcoEnergy’s Land Grab in Bagamoyo, p. 6. 
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Fig. 3.6 - A sign pointing to the Ecoenergy project in Bagamoyo. 
(Source: Action Aid, Take Action: Stop EcoEnergy’s Land Grab in Bagamoyo, p. 1) 
 
 
On the land obtained the investor initially planned to establish a commercial 
plantation and a processing facility over an area of 7,800 hectares and, in addition to this, 
source sugar from outgrowers farming around the project area60.    
The outgrower program proposed by EcoEnergy envisaged the involvement of 
approximately 1,500 smallholder farmers and the use of 3,400 hectares of village land, of 
which the company did not plan to assume control of61. The idea was to form 25 to 35 
‘block farms’, each comprising 50 farmers who would have cultivated sugarcane and 
supplied the product to the company at an agreed price62. Outgrowers were also offered 
the opportunity to work as employees of the company to earn wages as farm labourers63 
and increase their domestic income. The company stressed that no villager would have 
been displaced by the outgrower program, and that the area earmarked for it was generally 
 
60 Ivi, p. 11. 
61 Ivi, p. 23. 
62 Ivi, p. 6. 
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underutilized. Nevertheless, interviews with both the company and farmers confirmed 
that the details of the outgrower model were not made clear, which caused a great 
confusion and kept farmers in the dark about possible negative repercussions64. Without 
clear and complete information, communities in the affected areas could not assess 
whether the benefits of the outgrower program would have outweighed the risks 
associated with this scheme.  
Furthermore, the change in the production system would have required farmers to 
take out a loan of roughly USD 16,000 per person, a sum that is 30 times the minimum 
annual agricultural salary in Tanzania. According to the most optimistic forecasts, it 
would have taken at least seven years for the outgrowers to pay their loan back and start 
to make a profit65. Until loans were repaid, the only earnings for farmers would have had 
were those from farm labour at the plantation. Loans are particularly risky for poor 
farmers if they need to use their land as collateral, as it is the main assets of rural 
households, but Ecoenergy declared that the supply contract could be used as collateral 
instead of land66. Another critical issue regards the fact that in general farmers are likely 
to have little bargaining power when requesting loans from financial institutes and high-
interest rates demanded by banks to cover the high risk of the investment reduce greatly 
prospects for farmers’ returns67.  
Just as problematic is the monopsony regime, that is a particular form of market 
characterized by the presence of a single buyer and a plurality of sellers. In this  particular 
type of market, EcoEnergy had a much greater bargaining force on purchase prices than 





64 Ivi, p. 6. 
65 Ibidem. 
66 Ivi, p. 24. 
67 Ibidem. 




Fig. 3.7 - The former Razaba farm and Biga West location.  






The land allocated to EcoEnergy came from the former state farm Razaba, 
inaugurated in 1976 as part of collectivisation policies and then abandoned in 1993.  In 
the two decades following the farm abandonment by the state, dozens of households 
settled down with their families on this land69. Before the investors’arrival, it was mainly 
inhabited by poor smallholder farmers, each with a few acres of land growing staple crops 
and fruits, and about 70 pastoralists, who owned over 3,000 cattle and 650 goats70. The 
area on which the former Razaba farm stood was general land and as such consent from 
local communities before leasing the land to an investor was not required by legislation.  
 
69 Action Aid, Take Action: Stop EcoEnergy’s Land Grab in Bagamoyo, p. 11. 
70 Ivi, p. 13. 
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EcoEnergy applied also for a lease on a section of village land outside the Razaba 
farm, known as Biga West, which is disputed between the neighbouring villages Fukayosi 
and Matipwili. Fukayosi villagers accepted the proposal to allocate 2,000 hectares of their 
village land to the foreign company. However, the territory requested represents a key 
resource to Matipwili’s people, since their village centre is closer to it and they wanted to 
continue using the fertile area near the river for crop cultivation. Following this opposition 
from local communities, since 2012 the company and local authorities engaged in the 
dispute between Fukayosi and Matipwili in the hope to reach a compromise and enable 
EcoEnergy to use at least part of Biga West, but no agreement could not be reached71.  
According to initial forecasts, approximately 1,300 people living in and around 
the project area would be affected by the project. Around 300 villagers would have been 
physically displaced, while households comprising approximately 1,000 people living 
outside the plantation area would have lost their farmland within the former Razaba 
farm72. EcoEnergy declared itself aware that the area was inhabited and that affected 
people would have been involuntarily resettled, yet it insisted that many of these people 
were ‘invaders’ because the land belonged to the state of Tanzania73. The domestic 
government sided with the investor, arguing that the project was able to displace people 
from the area because it was general land. In any case, the company was required to pay 
compensation under performance standards of the International Finance Corporation and 
the African Development Bank74, which finance the project75.  
The 185 households living in di Gama Makaani, a village in the former Rabaza 
ranch, tried to oppose to the resettlement plan and in 2011 they initiated a legal dispute 
with EcoEnergy and the Government of Tanzania over what they claimed was their right 
to the land. In 2015 the Land Division of the High Court of Tanzania ruled in favour of 
the company and the government, as there was no evidence that the claimants had the 
right to occupy the farm76.  
 
71 F. Maganga, K. Askew, R. Odgaard and H. Stein, “Dispossession through Formalization: Tanzania and 
the G8 Land Agenda in Africa”, Asian Journal of African Studies 40: 1 (2016), pp. 19-20. 
72 Action Aid, Take Action: Stop EcoEnergy’s Land Grab in Bagamoyo, p. 13. 
73 Ivi, p. 11. 
74 EcoEnergy Ldt, White Paper on the Bagamoyo EcoEnergy Project in Tanzania, p. 16. 
75 Action Aid, Take Action: Stop EcoEnergy’s Land Grab in Bagamoyo, p. 6. 
76 Ivi, p. 6. 
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Affected households were not offered the choice of whether to resettle or not, they 
were only allowed to choose between a cash compensation or alternative land for being 
resettled. As a result, the principle of Free Prior Informed Consent was disregarded. 
Furthermore, many villagers to be resettled complained about the quality of the alternative 
land offered77. On the former Razaba farm lived also several Barabaig indigenous 
pastoralists and their cattle. EcoEnergy temporarily allocated 2,400 hectares of land so 
that the pastoralists could continue their grazing activities78, but had the company 
expanded its operations to that area, a further relocation could have occurred79. 
To a small extent, EcoEnergy kept its promises to the local population. The firm 
initiated training for new job opportunities and facilitated also substantial infrastructure 
investments, such as power lines and roads, as part of the outgrower program80. On the 
whole, however, it was extremely likely that benefits would have not outweighed the 
negative impacts linked to dispossession and land loss.  
Financial benefits to the local economy were also uncertain. EcoEnergy claimed 
that the project would have injected USD 45 to USD 50 million a year into the local 
economy. Yet, according to Action Aid estimates the figure would have been less 
optimistic, between USD 8.55 million and USD 11.5 million a year81. EcoEnergy also 
provided misleading information about the taxes it would have paid and government 
ownership in the investment. The company stated that EcoEnergy would have paid 30% 
corporate income tax, but information that Action Aid accessed revealed that in reality 
the company was granted a 10-year tax holiday in this respect82. The investor also claimed 
that the government ownership interest in the project would have been 25%, but it was 
found out that this was valid only starting from the 19th year of investment, while for the 
first 18 years the government’s share would have been only 10%83. 
As for the environmental consequences, the potential negative impacts on the 
Wami River were particularly worrisome as the amount of water EcoEnergy requested to 
withdraw for irrigation was excessive and would have reduced the flow of the river. 
 
77 Ibidem. 
78 Ivi, p. 20. 
79 EcoEnergy Ldt, White Paper on the Bagamoyo EcoEnergy Project in Tanzania, p. 16. 
80 Action Aid, Take Action: Stop EcoEnergy’s Land Grab in Bagamoyo, p. 31. 
81 Ivi, p. 28. 
82 Ivi, p. 6. 
83 Ibidem. 
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According to the predictions, this could have implied an intensification in conflicts related 
to both water and land access. Alterations in the quality of both surface and groundwater 
were also expected due to the use of agrochemicals in the plantation84. In order to 
safeguard the environment and water resources, EcoEnergy stated that a strategy for 
biodiversity conservation and two forestation programs would have been developed85, but 
it was not possible to find further details about these initiatives.   
Going against the will of the Tanzanian government and authorities, in 2015 
Action Aid published the report ‘Take Action: Stop EcoEnergy’s Land Grab in 
Bagamoyo, Tanzania’, which made the case public, and launched the #LANDfor 
Bagamoyo petition to request the suspension of the project and a new process of 
consultation with the communities. As international outrage grew, a considerable amount 
of funding was withdrawn, which led to a rapid downsizing of the operations envisaged 
by the project. After two years of campaign and thousands of signatures, Action Aid 
succeeded in its intent and the Government of Tanzania revoked the land title granted to 
the company86 stating that the investment could have potential negative impacts on water 
sources for wildlife in a neighbouring national park87. 
In response to cancelling its land lease, EcoEnergy sued the Government of 
Tanzania in an investor-state dispute settlement tribunal88. The company challenged the 
government on a range of issues, including violations of the protections afforded to 
investors under the bilateral investment treaty and international law, unreasonable and 
discriminatory measures against EcoEnergy and failure to ensure fair and equitable 
treatment to the investor company89. As of January 2019, the process was still underway90 





84 The Oakland Institute, Understanding land investment deals in Africa. Land grabs leave Africa thirsty, 
p. 2. 
85 EcoEnergy Ldt, White Paper on the Bagamoyo EcoEnergy Project in Tanzania, p. 7. 
86 www.actionaid.it/informati/notizie / landfor-bagamoyo [last accessed 15.10.2020].  
87 waronwant.org/sites/default/files/ISDS-files-EcoEnergy.pdf [last accessed 15.10.2020].  
88 Ibidem. 
89 EcoEnergy Ldt, White Paper on the Bagamoyo EcoEnergy Project in Tanzania, p. 18.  
90  waronwant.org/sites/default/files/ISDS-files-EcoEnergy.pdf [last accessed 15.10.2020].  
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3.3 Bioshape  
 
 
Fig. 3.8 - Project site of Bioshape in the Kilwa District.  
(Source: OXFAM, Burning land, burning the climate. The biofuel industry's capture of EU bioenergy 





As a third case study, the project of Bioshape Tanzania Ltd was selected. Bioshape 
Tanzania Ltd was a branch of Bioshape Holding BV, a company based in the 
Netherlands91, which signed a deal to obtain 34,000 hectares of land to develop a jatropha 
plantation for biodiesel production92. 
In 2006 a team of Tanzanian experts was hired to locate possible areas suitable for 
the cultivation and exploitation of jatropha and, after the identification of a number of 
possible locations, the choice fell on a plot of village land in the Kilwa District.  
 
91 E. Sulle and F. Nelson, Biofuels Investment and Community Land Tenure in Tanzania. The Case of 
Bioshape, Kilwa District, Future Agricultures, 2013, p. 10. 
92 N.E. Hultman, E.B. Sulle, C.W. Ramig and S. Sykora-Bodie, “Biofuels Investments 
in Tanzania: Policy Options for Sustainable Business Models”, The Journal of Environment & Development 
20:10 (2012), pp. 8-9. 
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The District is located in southeast Tanzania, which is regarded as one of the few 
regions whose natural vegetation has not been degraded yet93. According to the 2002 
census Kilwa had a population of 171,05794, of which almost 77% was involved in 
agriculture95. 
After having identified the target area, the company engaged with the 7,900 
inhabitants of the four villages surrounding it96 and a few months later the request for 
land was approved by Village Assemblies under certain conditions. Local demands 
included the building of a village meeting hall, construction of an electric generator, 
drilling of a communal water well and providing free lunch for the local school97. 
However, the approval was not adequately informed as villagers did not 
understand the terms of the land allocation that they were approving, nor did they were 
aware of the amount of land that was actually being allocated. Community members did 
not know that conceding their land to Bioshape involved the conversion of their village 
land into general land, the extinction of their customary rights and any future claim over 
the land. As a matter of fact, they believed that in case of failure of the project or non-use 
of the allocated land, then the territory would have reverted to them98. 
Another critical issue regards the land transfer itself. There is no available 
documentary evidence that this transfer took place and the TIC itself accused some 
irregularities on the part of the Ministry of Lands99. 
Initially, the company requested around 81,000 hectares of land, but in 2008 
signed a contract for the allocation of 34,000 hectares of woodland100. The business plan 
envisaged the establishment of plantations and the development of outgrower schemes101. 
Few months after that the land deal came into effect, a small demonstration plot of 1,000 
acres was set up102. 
 
93 Land Rights Research and Resources Institute, Accumulation by land dispossession and labour 
devaluation in Tanzania. The case of biofuel and forestry investments in Kilwa and Kilolo, 2010, p. 42. 
94 Ibidem. 
95 Ivi, p. 51. 
96 A. Gordon-Maclean, J. Laizer, P. Harriso and R Shemdoe, Biofuel Industry Study, Tanzania. An 
Assessment of the Current Situation, WWF, 2008, p. 24. 
97 Gabrielsson and Massay, A hunger for justice, p. 13. 
98 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels Investment and Community Land Tenure in Tanzania, p. 13. 
99 Ivi, p. 12. 
100 Hultman et al., “Biofuels Investments in Tanzania”, p. 8. 
101 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels Investment and Community Land Tenure in Tanzania, p. 11. 








The company paid a total compensation of USD 315,211 to compensate the four 
affected villages for their land103. Although it is a considerable amount of money, the 
compensation did not come remotely close to covering the real economic value of the 
asset ceded by the communities, or their long-run opportunity costs in terms of future 
development options104. Furthermore, 60% of the total compensation was retained by the 
District Council and the remaining 40% was distributed105 unevenly among the villages106 
and households affected by the investment107. Nevertheless, Bioshape is generally 
regarded as having paid compensation fairly adequately and procedurally108 and local 
communities declared themselves satisfied with the payment109. 
The investment brought about profound changes in the local economy. Bioshape 
offered a large number of jobs both as agricultural experts and as unskilled labourers, 
 
103 Gordon-Maclean et al., Biofuel Industry Study, Tanzania, p. 24. 
104 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels Investment and Community Land Tenure in Tanzania, p. 15. 
105 German et al., “Contemporary processes of large-scale land acquisition by investors”, p. 26. 
106 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels Investment and Community Land Tenure in Tanzania, p. 14. 
107 Gabrielsson and Massay, A hunger for justice, p. 14. 
108 Land Rights Research and Resources Institute, Accumulation by land dispossession and labour 
devaluation in Tanzania, pp. 50-51. 
109 Gordon-Maclean et al., Biofuel Industry Study, Tanzania, p. 24. 
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relatively high salaries and benefit packages. This attracted many skilled and casual 
workers also from other parts of Tanzania. Media reports indicate that the company hired 
approximately 100 workers with a permanent contract and 700 casual labourers, with 
many of the latter coming from the local area110. However, it should be noted that even 
in this case it is mostly casual labour and various complaints arose from working 
conditions. Criticisms were mainly about long working shifts with little or no breaks, 
heavy workload for women, exposure to harmful substances and low salaries111. 
Following the generation of new job opportunities, housing rents in the area 
skyrocketed and food and services demand also increased. Being among the first biofuel 
companies in Tanzania, Bioshape’s project also attracted visitors and researchers 
intrigued by the company’s operations. This led to the building of new restaurants, guest 
houses and houses for rent112. 
Bioshape promoted several Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives in its 
project area. Specifically, the program included the construction of a market in Mavuji 
village,  building of a maternity ward at a local hospital, improvement and implementation 
of a school, dental care in Kilwa Masoko primary schools, financial support a group of 
seven HIV/AIDS infected women, hosting Dutch volunteers working in a local secondary 
day school, renting a house to provide some orphans and their manager with 
accommodation and drilling some water wells113. A couple of these projects had time to 
be partially implemented and, in each case, were abandoned when BioShape left the 
district114. 
Indeed, these new opportunities for businesses, employment and social 
improvements generated by Bioshape had all a short life due to the collapse of the 
company a few months later115. The initial satisfaction of local communities with the 
promotion of social services and the employment creation116 has thus given away to 
frustration with the unfulfilled promises and displeasure with the company and 
 
110 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels Investment and Community Land Tenure in Tanzania, p. 14. 
111 Land Rights Research and Resources Institute, Accumulation by land dispossession and labour 
devaluation in Tanzania, pp. 53-54. 
112 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels Investment and Community Land Tenure in Tanzania, p. 14. 
113 Ibidem. 
114 Land Rights Research and Resources Institute, Accumulation by land dispossession and labour 
devaluation in Tanzania, p. 49-50 and Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels Investment and Community Land Tenure 
in Tanzania, pp. 14 -15. 
115 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels Investment and Community Land Tenure in Tanzania, pp. 14-15. 
116 Gordon-Maclean et al., Biofuel Industry Study, Tanzania, p. 24. 
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government officials who facilitated the investment117. Consequently, attitudes of 
affected communities towards outside investments changed drastically. Understanding of 
the past mistakes in not scrutinizing the investment conditions made them more careful 
and prudent with investment proposals118. 
One of the main negative effects of the arrival of BioShape in the area was a 
significant drop in food production due to the transfer of labour from village farms to the 
biofuel company. This undermined food security, which worsened once the project failed 
as people found themselves without wages and farmland119. 
Potential negative impacts on the environment were also feared. The conversion 
of native forests into jatropha landscapes could have resulted in significant 
deforestation120 and biodiversity reduction121. 
In 2009 Bioshape went bankrupt and withdrew from Kilwa122. Since then no 
production has taken place and land remained unused and closed off with fences and 
guards123. Villagers are unable to access the land within the project boundaries, which 
was previously used to cultivate fruits and crops, collect firewood and medicinal plants 
and included also a local cemetery and other sacred ceremonial sites124. 
However, the lack of evidence that the correct legal process was followed in the 
village land transfer into general land offers to affected people legal and procedural 
options to regain their land. Indeed, the adoption of improper procedures in issuing the 
derivative title without completing the land conversion process could be the pretext for 
pursuing a legal case. Alternatively, administrative channels could be used to request the 
Minister of Lands to de-register the land125. The District Council has been trying to repair 
the damage caused by the project failure by seeking to return part of the land to the 
 
117 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels Investment and Community Land Tenure in Tanzania, p. 15-16. 
118 Ivi, p. 16. 
119 Land Rights Research and Resources Institute, Accumulation by land dispossession and labour 
devaluation in Tanzania, p. 51-52. 
120 Gordon-Maclean et al., Biofuel Industry Study, Tanzania. p. 87. 
121 A. Gasparatos, L.Y. Lee, G.P. von Maltitz, M.V. Mathai, J.A. Puppim de Oliveira and K.J. Willis, 
Biofuels in Africa. Impacts on Ecosystem Services, Biodiversity and Human Well-being, Singapore, United 
Nations University and Institute of Advances Studies, p. 28. 
122 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels Investment and Community Land Tenure in Tanzania, p. 4. 
123 Gabrielsson and Massay, A hunger for justice, p. 13. 
124 Ivi, p. 15. 
125 Sulle and Nelson, Biofuels Investment and Community Land Tenure in Tanzania, p 19. 
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communities126, but it is a time-consuming procedure and no confirmation has yet been 



















































126 www.ippmedia.com/en/sport/kilwa-district-healing-wounds-inflicted-bioshape-investment [last 
accessed 15.10.2020] 
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3.4 A final account 
 
Investor Sun Biofuels 
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three water wells, a 
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improved schools, 
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roads.  
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Tab. 3.10 - Summary of the Sun Biofuels, EcoEnergy and Bioshape projects. 
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All these transnational land deals can be defined as land grabs according to the 
Tirana Declaration. First, the principle of the Free Prior Informed Consent was 
disregarded. Specifically, the affected villagers were not properly informed of the 
negative impacts that the investments could have brought. Partial information, coupled 
with a poor understanding of land laws among villagers, greatly reduced the capacity of 
rural people to negotiate favourable agreements with powerful investors. Sometimes the 
establishment of the project then disregarded socio-economic and environmental impacts 
as priority was given to the company’s profits maximisation. Furthermore, agreements 
were not finalized in transparent contracts nor binding commitments about activities, 
employment, and benefits-sharing were specified. Finally, effective democratic planning 
and meaningful participation were also lacking.  
While operating, the projects brought some benefits to local communities, above 
all new job opportunities, and stimulated the local economy. However, these benefits 
were limited and short-lived, in all cases falling far short of what communities expected 
when agreeing to the initial investments.  
On the other hand, the negative impacts have far outweighed the positive ones. 
Some villages have lost significant portions of their farmland, forests, water sources 
which were of vital importance for their livelihood. This undermined their food security 
and aggravated the economic situation of several households. Villagers affected were 
poorly compensated or did not receive any payment at all for the land lost.  
In general, investors have not kept the commitments made in exchange for the land 
grant. The communities cannot take advantage of the promised social services such as 
schools, medical centres and wells and cannot legally claim anything as the promises have 
not been codified in a written contract.  
In conclusion, a rural development strategy based on such large-scale foreign 
investments presents numerous risks and does not appear to be a winning strategy for 
improving the lives of Tanzanians and boosting the economy. It remains to be asked what 
amendments should be made to maximize the benefits brought by the investments and 





In a context where rural areas remain characterized by high rates of poverty, the 
Tanzanian government, like others in developing countries, has placed considerable trust 
in large land-based foreign investments. However, promoting these investments does not 
appear to be a winning strategy. Negative impacts result to be in a greater number than 
the positive ones and are likely to hit hardest those who are already socially and 
economically the most disempowered categories.  
The issue that needs to be addressed more urgently is the lack of information and 
transparency characterizing these deals. First of all, it is crucial to ensure that the 
communities affected by a project fully understand the risks and potential negative 
impacts of the investment. Moreover, widespread and adequate knowledge of land 
legislations and investment policies among villagers needs to be promoted. For example, 
it is fundamental that villagers be aware that the conversion of village land into general 
land is an irreversible process involving the extinction of their customary rights. 
Consultation processes should then be mediated by a disinterested third party, 
whose task would be to make sure that villagers have access to complete information and 
are able to negotiate the terms of the project with the investor.  To assist small-scale 
farmers, some organizations in Tanzania, such as Action Aid, HakiArdhi, MVIWATA 
and the Legal and Human Rights Centre, have already launched initiatives to empower 
local communities and ensure that any land transfer is based on Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent. However, the reach of these organizations is still limited to a small fraction of 
Tanzania’s villages1. 
In addition, agreements should be encoded in a written contract to guarantee to the 
community members the possibility to address and dispute any wrongdoings against 
them. Furthermore, contracts should be made public, so that the details of financial 
obligations, projections and safeguards to communities are known. 
As regards compensation practices, each villager should receive a ‘full and fair 
compensation’, as stated in the Land Act itself. The compensation needs to be based on 
 
1 Gabrielsson and Massay, A hunger for justice, p. 16. 
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true economic opportunity costs and extended to all individuals affected by the 
investment.   
Of paramount importance is also the rethinking of the framework governing land 
investments to limit the damage in the event of abandonment or failure of the project, 
which is a concrete risk. For example, if the process of land conversion were reversible, 
in case the project fails or is abandoned, the plots of land could return to the local 
communities rather than remain unused.  
Furthermore, as it was shown, land deals generally involve vast expanses of land, 
but sometimes the companies manage to make only a small part of it operational. A 
further solution to limit the risks and potential damages of large-scale projects could be 
to grant foreign investor only a limited number of hectares at first and allocate additional 
plots of land only once the company has proved its capability to manage and further 
implement the project.  
Land laws should be amended and properly enforced also to clearly define what 
constitutes ‘general land’ and ‘unoccupied and unused land’. In this way, law could not 
be interpreted arbitrarily and bent to the interests of the most powerful.   
These are the main critical points that urgently need to be addressed to permit the 
realization of the benefits of land-based investments in Tanzania.  Currently, several 
institutes have formulated different guidelines that should be followed in the investment 
process, such as the Guidelines for Sustainable Liquid Biofuels Development in 
Tanzania. However, since they represent mere recommendations and lack the force of 
law, they are systematically ignored. As long as investors are not forced to follow certain 
procedures and comply with specific indications, it is difficult for real changes to take 
place.   
To conclude, it is crucial to note that, if small-scale farmers are the main losers of 
land investments, there are no real winners either. Apart from the compensation fees 
collected by the District Councils, in each project investigated in this thesis the 
Government of Tanzania did not obtain the financial benefits expected, such as payments 
for utility fees or turnover. Investors have not profited from the projects either, as they 
made capital investments to make the plantations operative only to cease the production 
before any crops could be turned into a commercial product for sale. It remains thus to 
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ask whom these deals benefit and whether they are actually the best strategy to improve 
the lives of the Tanzanians and stimulate economic growth.  
A more critical and in-depth analysis of the various local contexts could result in 
more effective development strategies. In the case of the Kisarawe District, for example, 
it was shown how the lack of appropriate transport infrastructures has an impact on local 
agricultural productivity and is one of the causes of poor living conditions for the 
inhabitants of the region. Therefore, even the implementation of simple infrastructures 
could have significant positive effects on the local context, without necessarily resorting 
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Summary in Italian 
 
 
Negli ultimi anni si è registrato un aumento esponenziale degli investimenti 
fondiari transnazionali a livello globale e in particolare nell’Africa sub-sahariana. Questo 
fenomeno ha generato accese discussioni circa gli effetti degli investimenti sulle 
condizioni di vita delle comunità rurali. Se da un lato si è parlato di land grabbing, ovvero 
di accaparramento delle terre, enfatizzando gli impatti negativi e condannando la 
violazione dei diritti delle popolazioni locali, dall’altro questi investimenti potrebbero 
potenzialmente contribuire allo sviluppo economico e alla riduzione della povertà rurale.  
Nel primo capitolo di questa tesi viene delineato il contesto globale in cui si 
inserisce l’odierna corsa alla terra, con particolare attenzione alla situazione in Africa. 
Nel continente africano gli accaparramenti terrieri non rappresentano un fenomeno 
nuovo, in quanto già durante il periodo coloniale le potenze europee si arrogarono il diritto 
di dichiarare sotto il loro dominio le terre apparentemente inoccupate, senza curarsi dei 
diritti delle popolazioni locali. Una seconda ondata di land grabbing fu perpetrata poi 
dagli stessi governi locali indipendenti tramite politiche di nazionalizzazione ed 
espropriazioni ai danni dei loro stessi concittadini. Verso la fine del XX secolo in molti 
Paesi africani si verificarono profondi cambiamenti politici ed economici che portarono 
ad una maggiore apertura agli investimenti privati e molti governi adottarono vari 
provvedimenti legali e fiscali nel tentativo di attrarre anche capitali stranieri. Questi 
incentivi hanno ampiamente facilitato l’odierna corsa alla terra, che è stata scatenata 
all’inizio degli anni Duemila da un insieme di vari fattori socioeconomici che hanno agito 
in simultanea. 
Le principali cause dell’aumento degli investimenti terrieri transnazionali sono 
state le preoccupazioni per la sicurezza alimentare, l’aumento della domanda di 
biocarburanti e la crisi finanziaria del 2008.  
Tra il 2005 e il 2008 ci fu un’improvvisa impennata dei prezzi di vari prodotti 
alimentari di base. In risposta al rincaro dei prezzi esplosero proteste e disordini sociali 
in numerosi Paesi, mettendo in allarme soprattutto i governi che facevano ampio 
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affidamento sulle importazioni dal mercato globale per sfamare la loro popolazione. La 
necessità di assicurarsi delle scorte di cibo a prezzi abbordabili spinse alcuni Paesi, ricchi 
di risorse economiche e poveri di terra fertile, ad acquistare o affittare vasti tratti di terra 
in altri Paesi con l’intento di esternalizzare la produzione alimentare anziché fare 
affidamento sul mercato globale. In alcuni casi la sicurezza alimentare è stata messa a 
rischio non solo dalla crisi dei prezzi alimentari, ma anche da alcuni cambiamenti nella 
dieta nazionale. La popolazione cinese, per esempio, negli ultimi decenni ha integrato una 
quantità sempre maggiore di carne nella propria dieta. Le risorse naturali cinesi non sono 
sufficienti per coltivare la quantità di soia necessaria per nutrire gli animali e acquistare 
terreni esteri per produrla si è presentata come una soluzione più economica rispetto ad 
acquistarla dal mercato globale. Infine, la costante crescita della popolazione globale 
aggrava ulteriormente il problema della sicurezza alimentare a livello globale.  
Il secondo fattore che ha innescato la corsa alla terra è stata la crescente domanda 
di biocarburanti, che recentemente hanno cominciato a essere considerati come 
un’alternativa ai combustibili fossili. L’Unione Europea, gli Stati Uniti e altri Paesi hanno 
adottato delle politiche che promuovono l’uso di combustibili verdi e numerose 
compagnie hanno risposto a queste normative acquistando vaste estensioni di terra per 
produrre canna da zucchero, jatropha e altre materie prime da cui si ricavano 
biocarburanti.  
Infine, a scatenare la corsa alla terra ha contribuito ampiamente anche la crisi 
finanziaria del 2008. Dopo il crollo dei mercati finanziari internazionali si è cominciato a 
ritenere il tradizionale mercato azionario rischioso e volatile, motivo per cui molti 
investitori hanno preferito dirottare i loro capitali verso asset alternativi. In questo 
contesto la terra, essendo un bene sempre più richiesto, si è presentata come un 
investimento con allettanti prospettive di guadagno. 
Attualmente numerosi Stati del mondo sono coinvolti nelle transazioni fondiarie. 
Particolarmente attive negli investimenti agricoli sono innanzitutto le economie 
emergenti, come ad esempio Cina, India e Sudafrica. In particolare, la Cina e altre potenze 
asiatiche sviluppate come Hong Kong, Singapore, il Giappone e la Corea del Sud, sono 
state costrette ad esternalizzare parte della produzione di cibo e biocarburanti in quanto 
non possiedono terra fertile e risorse idriche sufficienti per soddisfare la domanda 
alimentare ed energetica interna. Un altro gruppo di grandi investitori è quello dei Paesi 
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del Golfo, i quali in seguito alla crisi dei prezzi alimentari si sono affrettati ad acquistare 
terreni stranieri da coltivare al fine di offrire ai loro abitanti cibo a prezzi abbordabili ed 
evitare così disordini sociali che avrebbero messo a rischio la stabilità politica. Infine, 
anche l’Unione Europea e gli Stati Uniti risultano particolarmente attivi nelle transazioni 
fondiarie internazionali, ma in questo caso gli investimenti sono guidati principalmente 
dalle politiche sui biocarburanti, da strategie di integrazione verticale nel settore 
agroalimentare e dalla speculazione finanziaria. Gli investitori provenienti da Stati Uniti 
e Unione Europea sono prevalentemente compagnie private, mentre nelle altre regioni 
sono più attivi gli enti pubblici o statali.  
Anche per quanto riguarda i Paesi destinatari è possibile identificare delle zone 
maggiormente interessate dagli investimenti fondiari. Vaste estensioni di terra sono state 
acquistate nei Paesi facenti parte dell’ex Unione Sovietica, anche se gli accordi stipulati 
in questa regione hanno ricevuto scarsa attenzione mediatica e accademica. Numerose 
transazioni sono state registrate poi in Africa, soprattutto lungo i maggiori fiumi e la costa 
orientale del continente. Anche l’America Latina e il Sud-est asiatico hanno attirato 
numerosi investimenti. Ad accomunare i Paesi destinatari sono un PIL significativamente 
più basso rispetto ai Paesi investitori e un regime fondiario debole, che non tutela 
adeguatamente le popolazioni rurali. Sebbene di recente in alcuni Paesi siano state 
adottare misure per riconoscere e proteggere maggiormente i diritti delle popolazioni 
rurali, in genere i governi dei Paesi destinatari si sono dimostrati più interessati ad attirare 
gli investimenti stranieri, visti come un’opportunità per stimolare il settore agricolo e 
rilanciare l’economia nazionale. Solo in una minima percentuale di casi le popolazioni 
interessate dal progetto d’investimento sono state appropriatamente consultate e coinvolte 
nei processi decisionali, motivo per cui la maggior parte delle acquisizioni o concessioni 
terriere possono definirsi dei veri e propri accaparramenti che violano i diritti delle 
comunità. Molti accordi sono stati stipulati in ambienti caratterizzati da corruzione 
dilagante e scarsa trasparenza, che minacciano ulteriormente i diritti della popolazione. 
Gli investimenti prevedono spesso progetti su larga scala che hanno pesanti 
ripercussioni nei contesti locali. Solitamente la terra assegnata agli investitori ha un ruolo 
di fondamentale importanza nel sostentamento delle comunità rurali perché offre loro 
l’opportunità di coltivare prodotti alimentari, pascolare il bestiame e ottenere legname, 
carbone e altri materiali. L’impatto più visibile delle transazioni fondiarie è il 
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trasferimento degli abitanti dalla zona e la perdita dei terreni su cui si basava il loro 
sostentamento, con il conseguente aumento dell’incertezza alimentare e della povertà. La 
perdita dei terreni comporta inoltre una serie di altre conseguenze secondarie, come ad 
esempio l’inasprimento delle disuguaglianze sociali e di genere, in quanto gli impatti 
negativi tendono a ricadere soprattutto sulle donne e su altre categorie socialmente ed 
economicamente più deboli. In alcuni casi i cittadini che sono stati espropriati della 
propria terra ricevono un indennizzo economico, che però non risulta quasi mai 
sufficiente a compensare la perdita subita.  
D’altro canto, è corretto notare che gli investimenti possono avere anche degli 
impatti positivi nei contesti locali. I progetti creano nuovi posti di lavoro, anche se in 
molti casi si tratta di occupazioni temporanee, dal salario relativamente basso e dalle 
condizioni di lavoro pesanti e rischiose. Si possono inoltre verificare alcuni effetti di 
spillover nelle zone in prossimità del progetto, dove i contadini possono avere accesso 
alle tecnologie e al know-how dell’investitore. A beneficiare di alcuni progetti sono anche 
le casse statali, in quanto, sebbene i prezzi di vendita e i canoni d’affitto siano bassi, non 
sono comunque trascurabili per l’economia nazionale. Alcuni investitori stranieri 
promuovono infine la costruzione di infrastrutture, spesso carenti nei contesti rurali.  
Le transazioni hanno pesanti ripercussioni non solo a livello socioeconomico, ma 
anche a livello ambientale. Al fine di avere la massima resa possibile si fa spesso ricorso 
a modelli di produzione industrializzati intensivi, che causano causano il degradamento 
del suolo e delle risorse idriche, inquinamento e riduzione della biodiversità. 
Dopo aver presentato il fenomeno del land grabbing in generale e le dinamiche 
degli investimenti terrieri a livello globale, nel secondo capitolo della tesi il focus viene 
ristretto alla Tanzania. Questo Paese africano infatti ha attirato numerosi investitori 
stranieri grazie alla sua stabilità politica, economica, favorevoli condizioni geo-
climatiche e incentivi offerti dal governo tanzaniano. 
Nel corso dei secoli la Tanzania è passata sotto vari domini stranieri e ha 
sperimentato diversi regimi fondiari. Se in epoca precoloniale la terra era proprietà 
pubblica, sotto il controllo delle potenze europee furono varate delle leggi che 
espropriarono le popolazioni locali dei loro possedimenti. Alla fine del XIX secolo, 
quando la Tanzania era sotto il dominio tedesco, fu emanato un decreto che dichiarava 
proprietà dell’Impero tutti i terreni della colonia. Un provvedimento simile fu adottato in 
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seguito dai britannici, che dopo la Prima Guerra Mondiale subentrarono ai tedeschi nel 
dominio della Tanzania e proclamarono la terra in questo Paese sotto il controllo 
coloniale, pur riconoscendo alla popolazione locale dei diritti consuetudinari. In questo 
modo si venne a creare un sistema dualistico di gestione della terra, in cui i diritti dello 
stato erano superiori a quelli consuetudinari. Nel secondo dopoguerra, quando cominciò 
a diffondersi il concetto del diritto all’auto-determinazione dei popoli, i tanzaniani 
iniziarono la loro lotta per l’indipendenza dal dominio coloniale. Nel 1964, dopo anni di 
battaglie politiche sotto la guida di Julius Nyerere e proteste popolari, fu proclamato lo 
stato unificato e indipendente della Tanzania. Nyerere fu eletto Presidente e, non appena 
entrato in carica, dichiarò la Tanzania uno ‘Stato socialista’ e adottò delle misure che 
facilitavano il controllo sempre più centralizzato della terra. Si adoperò inoltre per riunire 
la popolazione rurale in villaggi, anche tramite trasferimenti forzati, e tentò di creare dei 
cosiddetti ujamaa vijijini, ovvero villaggi in cui le comunità lavoravano e coltivavano la 
terra collettivamente. Dopo il ritiro di Nyerere dalla scena politica negli anni Ottanta, la 
Tanzania cominciò ad allontanarsi dal modello socialista e intraprese un processo di 
liberalizzazione dell’economia di mercato, che provocò un forte aumento delle 
acquisizioni fondiarie da parte di investitori sia nazionali sia stranieri. Le transazioni 
avvennero in un contesto dominato da una burocrazia statale inefficiente e da una generale 
confusione sulle modalità di gestione del territorio, alimentando così il malcontento 
popolare. In risposta alle tensioni crescenti, il governo tanzaniano introdusse delle nuove 
normative, ovvero il Land Act e il Village Land Act, che regolano ancora oggi il regime 
fondiario vigente in Tanzania. 
Il Land Act ha istituito tre categorie di terra, affidandone la gestione a diversi enti. 
La prima è la general land, che è amministrata direttamente dal governo e rappresenta 
circa il 2% del territorio nazionale. La seconda, denominata reserved land, ricopre circa 
il 28% dell’area del Paese e viene amministrata da apposite agenzie governative. La 
reserved land comprende principalmente parchi nazionali, riserve di caccia e forestali. La 
terza categoria è classificata come village land e comprende i territori entro i confini dei 
villaggi e qualsiasi appezzamento che la popolazione rurale utilizza o occupa da almeno 
12 anni. Questi terreni ricoprono circa il 70% del territorio nazionale e la loro 
amministrazione è affidata alle autorità di villaggio.  
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La gestione della village land è trattata più nello specifico nel Village Land Act, 
che ha suddiviso questi terreni in tre sottocategorie: quelli occupati su base individuale, 
quelli utilizzati su base collettiva e quelli a disposizione per future concessioni individuali 
o usi comuni.   
Tutta la terra è proprietà pubblica e la popolazione può accedervi attraverso diritti 
consuetudinari, che, sebbene siano stati istituzionalizzati ed equiparati ad altri diritti 
fondiari, godono spesso di una minore protezione legale. La legge tanzaniana prevede la 
registrazione e il rilascio di titoli di occupazione sia individuali sia collettivi, i quali 
permettono alla popolazione rurale di documentare i propri diritti e tutelarsi 
maggiormente. 
La Tanzania è ancora un paese rurale, in cui il settore agricolo riveste un ruolo di 
primaria importanza nell’economia locale e nella vita della popolazione nazionale, 
nonostante sia ancora arretrato e sottosviluppato. Il governo tanzaniano è convinto che 
gli investimenti di compagnie straniere, grazie ai loro ingenti capitali e alle tecniche di 
produzione industriale, possano aumentare la produttività agricola e stimolare così 
l’economia e ridurre la povertà. A tal fine sono state promosse varie iniziative per attirare 
gli investimenti stranieri, di cui le principali sono il programma Kilimo Qwanza e il 
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). Kilimo Kwanza è una 
campagna lanciata nel 2009 con l’obiettivo di coinvolgere gli investitori privati nello 
sviluppo di un’agricoltura commerciale di larga scala da affiancare alla piccola 
produzione esistente. SAGCOT designa invece un piano di sviluppo del settore agricolo 
basato sulla partnership tra il settore pubblico e quello privato ed è stato avviato nel 2010 
come implementazione del programma Kilimo Kwanza. L’intento è quello di permettere 
ai piccoli produttori locali di collaborare con le grandi aziende agroalimentari globali e 
consentire così ai contadini di accedere a input per la produzione, know-how e nuovi 
mercati. I progetti che rientrano all’interno di questa iniziativa si concentrano lungo un 
corridoio agricolo che occupa circa un terzo del territorio tanzaniano ed è composto dagli 
altopiani si estendono tra Dar es Salaam e il confine con lo Zambia, lungo cui si snodano 
le principali reti energetiche e di comunicazioni del Paese. 
Per legge gli investitori stranieri non possono acquistare appezzamenti di terra in 
Tanzania, ma possono ricevere dei diritti di occupazione sulla terra classificata come 
general land. Una delle procedure più seguite per ottenere in concessione un terreno è 
 123 
attraverso il Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), ovvero l’agenzia governativa 
responsabile della promozione, coordinamento e facilitazione degli investimenti fondiari. 
Percorrendo questa strada l’azienda straniera deve esporre un progetto d’investimento al 
TIC, che lo valuta e approva o rifiuta la domanda. Se l’esito è positivo seguono alcuni 
passaggi burocratici e, infine, viene trasferito un titolo derivativo dal TIC all’investitore, 
che assume quindi il controllo della terra. La principale criticità di questa procedura è che 
la terra amministrata dal TIC è esclusivamente general land, che, come accennato in 
precedenza, comprende solo una minima parte del territorio tanzaniano, mentre le grandi 
aziende necessitano in genere vasti appezzamenti di terra per i loro progetti su larga scala. 
Per questo motivo, alcuni investitori preferiscono seguire un’altra strategia, ovvero 
negoziare con le popolazioni locali e convincerle a cedere la loro terra, spesso 
promettendo loro indennizzi economici, generazione di nuovi posti di lavoro e 
costruzione di infrastrutture. Una volta ottenuto il consenso delle comunità, la village 
land viene convertita in general land, un processo irreversibile che estingue i diritti 
consuetudinari della popolazione. Infine, il TIC rilascia un diritto di occupazione 
all’investitore.  
Sebbene gli investitori siano per legge tenuti ad incontrare le autorità e le comunità 
interessate, spiegare le ragioni e le modalità dell’investimento e rispondere alle domande 
dell’assemblea di villaggio, il processo di consultazione della popolazione risulta spesso 
insoddisfacente. Le comunità sono sistematicamente tenute all’oscuro delle possibili 
conseguenze negative dell’investimento che viene loro proposto e non hanno accesso a 
informazioni chiare ed esaustive che consentano loro di compiere scelte consapevoli. Gli 
incontri con gli investitori tendono a essere scarsamente partecipativi e si creano spesso 
della relazione asimmetriche di potere, che non permettono alle comunità di negoziare le 
condizioni del progetto. Le promesse fatte dagli investitori alla popolazione sono 
principalmente verbali e raramente vengono codificate in un contratto scritto. In assenza 
di un documento ufficiale, è quindi arduo ritenere gli investitori responsabili nel caso in 
cui gli accordi non vengano rispettati. Ugualmente problematiche sono le procedure di 
pagamento degli indennizzi ai tanzaniani che hanno perso la loro terra. Innanzitutto, i 
risarcimenti vengono retribuiti solo ai cittadini che possono dimostrare di coltivare o 
possedere altre attività permanenti sui terreni in questione. Pascolo, caccia e accesso alle 
risorse forestali e idriche non sono invece riconosciute e quindi in questi casi non viene 
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corrisposto nessun risarcimento. Inoltre, anche nel caso in cui venga pagata un’indennità, 
raramente le comunità sono adeguatamente ricompensate per la perdita della loro terra, 
che rappresenta la fonte primaria e insostituibile del loro sostentamento.  
Per capire se la strategia del governo tanzaniano di rilanciare l’agricoltura tramite 
gli investimenti stranieri possa essere efficace, nel terzo e ultimo capitolo della relazione 
vengono presentati i progetti d’investimento condotti da tre compagnie straniere in 
Tanzania.  
Il primo caso di studio è dedicato al progetto di Sun Biofuels, un’azienda 
britannica che ha ampiamente investito nella coltivazione di vegetali per la produzione di 
biocarburanti in Africa occidentale e meridionale.  
Nel 2009 Sun Biofuels ha ottenuto 8 211 ettari nel distretto di Kisarawe per avviare 
una piantagione di jatropha e uno stabilimento di lavorazione. Si tratta di una regione 
estremamente povera ma situata in una posizione strategica che offre un gran potenziale 
per la produzione agroindustriale. Dal momento che la terra individuata dalla compagnia 
era classificata come village land, è stato necessario ottenere il consenso delle comunità 
locali, le quali hanno accettato di buon grado di cedere i loro possedimenti in cambio 
dell’indennizzo economico, nuove opportunità di lavoro e infrastrutture che la compagnia 
aveva promesso loro. Non si può tuttavia affermare che il consenso delle comunità locali 
sia stato consapevole e informato, in quanto negli incontri di consultazione non sono stati 
esposti i potenziali effetti negativi che il progetto avrebbe potuto avere nel contesto locale 
e si è registrata una bassa partecipazione da parte delle comunità interessate.  
La maggior parte dei territori concessi alla compagnia comprendevano foreste che 
gli abitanti locali utilizzavano per varie attività, come ad esempio il pascolo o la raccolta 
di cibo, e che ricoprivano un ruolo di fondamentale importanza per il loro sostentamento. 
Inoltre, all’interno di terreni assegnati alla compagnia investitrice si trovano fonti d’acqua 
utilizzate dalle comunità. Una volta perso l’accesso alle risorse forestali e idriche, gli 
abitanti dei villaggi della zona si sono trovati costretti a comprare cibo, acqua e altri beni 
che prima potevano avere gratuitamente. In alternativa, alcuni membri delle comunità 
hanno cominciato a percorrere lunghe distanze per raggiungere altre aree dove possono 
recuperare liberamente i prodotti di cui necessitavano, ma in questo caso si riduce 
sensibilmente il tempo e le energie che possono essere dedicate all’agricoltura familiare, 
 125 
la cui produttività è scesa ulteriormente. Solo alcune famiglie, come ad esempio i 
venditori di prodotti alimentari, hanno tratto beneficio da questa nuova situazione.  
L’indennizzo promesso è stato corrisposto diversi anni dopo la firma del contratto 
ed è stato esteso solo a una minima parte delle persone coinvolte dall’investimento. 
Disattese sono state le promesse di infrastrutture che la compagnia aveva fatto prima 
dell’investimento per convincere ad approvare l’investimento.  
L’unica clausola mantenuta è stata la creazione di posti di lavoro, in quanto circa 
750 abitanti locali sono stati assunti per lavorare nella piantagione, sebbene i lavoratori 
non venissero adeguatamente tutelati. Il progetto di Sun Biofuels ha attratto contadini 
anche da altre regioni, stimolando così l’economia locale tramite l’aumento della 
domanda dovuto all’arrivo di nuove persone.  
I pochi benefici portati dall’investimento non sono stati però duraturi in quanto nel 
2011 Sun Biofuels ha dichiarato bancarotta. La piantagione è stata abbandonata e la terra 
in questione è attualmente inutilizzata.  
Il secondo caso di studio analizzato riguarda EcoEnergy, una compagnia privata 
svedese che nel 2013 ha ottenuto una concessione di 24 000 ettari nel distretto di 
Bagayomo per la produzione industriale di canna da zucchero. Il progetto in realtà ha 
avuto vita breve, in quanto all’inizio del 2016 il governo tanzaniano ha revocato la 
concessione, fermandone così l’attuazione. I potenziali impatti che il progetto avrebbe 
potuto avere sono però allarmanti.  
Secondo il piano iniziale, oltre a creare una piantagione sui terreni ottenuti in 
concessione, EcoEnergy intendeva coinvolgere circa 1 500 contadini locali tramite 
accordi di agricoltura contrattuale, i quali avrebbero dovuto formare varie piccole aziende 
agricole e coltivare canna da zucchero, che sarebbe stata poi venduta alla compagnia 
svedese. Il problema principale di questo piano è che, per creare le aziende e collaborare 
con la compagnia, ciascun contadino avrebbe dovuto richiedere in prestito di circa USD 
16 000, una somma corrispondente a 30 volte il salario mimino annuo nel settore agricolo. 
Inoltre, trattandosi di un regime di monopsonio, ovvero in cui è presente un unico 
acquirente del prodotto, EcoEnergy avrebbe avuto una forza contrattuale sui prezzi di 
acquisto molto maggiore di quella dei piccoli produttori. 
Dal momento che i terreni concessi all’azienda erano già classificati come general 
land, la legge non richiedeva che le gli abitanti della zona venissero consultati prima di 
 126 
procedere con l’investimento. Secondo le stime circa circa 300 tanzaniani che abitavano 
nell’area destinata alla compagnia sarebbero stati costretti a traferirsi e altri 1 000 
avrebbero perso i loro terreni agricoli. Alle famiglie non è stata offerta la possibilità di 
scegliere se essere reinsediati o meno, è stato consentito loro solo di scegliere tra un 
risarcimento in denaro o un appezzamento di terreno alternativo dove trasferirsi.  
In minima parte, EcoEnergy ha mantenuto le promesse fatte alla popolazione 
locale. L’azienda aveva infatti avviato attività di formazione per nuove opportunità 
lavorative e iniziato a sviluppare alcune infrastrutture, come ad esempio linee elettriche 
e strade. Nel complesso, tuttavia, i benefici sarebbero stati comunque piuttosto limitati e 
probabilmente non avrebbero controbilanciato gli impatti negativi legati 
all’espropriazione e alla perdita di terreni. Secondo alcune stime, i profitti economici di 
cui avrebbe dovuto godere l’economia locale sarebbero stati di gran lunga minori di 
quanto inizialmente preventivato. L’investimento avrebbe potuto avere inoltre gravi 
ripercussioni sull’ambiente e sulle risorse idriche della zona a causa dell’eccessivo 
prelievo d’acqua per l’irrigazione e l’uso di fertilizzanti chimici che avrebbero degradato 
il suolo e l’acqua nelle falde sotterranee.  
Nel 2015 Action Aid ha lanciato una petizione per fermare l’investimento e 
pubblicato un report che ha reso il caso pubblico, suscitando lo sdegno internazionale e 
spingendo il governo a revocare la concessione pochi mesi dopo. In risposta 
all’annullamento del contratto, EcoEnergy ha intrapreso un’azione legale contro il 
governo tanzaniano. Il processo è tutt’ora in corso e il destino degli abitanti della zona 
rimane quindi incerto. 
Infine, come terzo caso di studio viene presentato il progetto di Bioshape, 
un’azienda olandese aveva avviato in Tanzania una piantagione di jatropha per la 
produzione di biodiesel. Grazie all’aiuto di alcuni intermediari, la compagnia ha 
individuato un’area adatta per l’investimento nel distretto di Kilwa e convinto i 7 900 
abitanti dei villaggi interessati a cedere i loro possedimenti in cambio della costruzione 
di alcune infrastrutture. Anche in questo caso però il consenso non può definirsi informato 
in quanto alle comunità non è stato chiaramente fatto comprendere che avrebbero perso 
definitivamente la loro terra e che i loro diritti fondiari sarebbero stati estinti per sempre. 
Nel 2008 la compagnia ha firmato un contratto per l’allocazione di un appezzamento pari 
a 34 000 ettari. 
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Come risarcimento è stato corrisposto ai villaggi un pagamento che, pur non 
coprendo il costo reale della terra, è stato considerato comunque soddisfacente. Bioshape 
ha assunto inoltre 700 contadini locali, sebbene anche in questo caso le condizioni di 
lavoro siano state fortemente criticate. La piantagione ha portato significativi benefici 
all’economia locale, stimolata dall’arrivo di contadini dalle zone circostanti e ricercatori 
interessati al progetto. L’azienda olandese ha inoltre costruito infrastrutture e realizzato 
vari programmi sociali come iniziative di Responsabilità Sociale d’Impresa.  
Purtroppo tutti questi benefici e vantaggi sono stati effimeri in quanto la 
compagnia è fallita pochi mesi dopo l’avvio del progetto. L’iniziale soddisfazione delle 
comunità locali ha lasciato quindi posto alla frustrazione per le promesse non mantenute 
e le aspettative disilluse. Il terreno su cui sorgeva la piantagione è attualmente inutilizzato 
e recintato e le comunità non possono accedervi. È però possibile che i villaggi riescano 
a riavere la loro terra per vie legali o amministrative, in quanto non c’è traccia di alcun 
documento ufficiale che attesti la conversione della village land in general land. È quindi 
probabile che ci siano state alcune irregolarità nel processo di allocazione su cui si può 
far leva affinchè i terreni vengano restituiti alle comunità. 
Tutti e tre gli investimenti analizzati possono quindi essere definiti dei veri e propri 
accaparramenti. Sebbene gli investimenti abbiamo portato alcuni temporanei benefici alle 
popolazioni rurali e all’economia locale, non sono stati sufficienti per compensare gli 
impatti negativi, che si sono rivelati estremamente pensanti.  
Al fine di limitare gli effetti negativi e massimizzare quelli positivi è necessario 
apportare con urgenza delle modifiche nel processo di allocazione della terra agli 
investitori stranieri. Innanzitutto è fondamentale assicurarsi che le comunità rurali 
ricevano informazioni complete, comprendano appieno i rischi dei progetti e siano in 
grado di negoziare con gli investitori condizioni più vantaggiose, preferibilmente con il 
supporto e la supervisione di un mediatore. Gli accordi dovrebbero inoltre venir sempre 
codificati in un contratto scritto e tutti gli abitanti che vengono danneggiati 
dall’investimento dovrebbero ricevere un risarcimento adeguato. Di fondamentale 
importanza è anche una riforma delle normative che regolano le transazioni fondiarie al 
fine di limitare i danni nel caso di abbandono o fallimento del progetto, per esempio 
rendendo il processo di conversione della village land in general land reversibile. 
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In generale, dagli esempi riportati si può concludere che la promozione di 
investimenti stranieri su larga scala non sembra essere una strategia vincente per stimolare 
l’economia tanzaniana e migliorare le condizioni di vita della popolazione rurale.  
 
